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Abstract
The purpose of this study was to examine the relation between psychopathy and emotion
regulation as serially mediated by emotional motives and goals in an all-male sample. Six
serial mediation models were proposed, three for each motive-type (i.e., hedonistic,
instrumental), and two for each emotion (i.e., anger, fear, joy). Eight-hundred and
seventy-eight participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk).

Results indicate that male MTurk workers with greater levels of psychopathy have poorer
emotion regulation, emotion goals for experiencing anger and fear, hedonistic and
instrumental motives for experiencing anger and fear, emotion goals for not experiencing
joy, and hedonistic and instrumental motives for not experiencing joy. Four of the six
serial mediation models were significant. Specifically, the relation between psychopathy
and emotion regulation was serially mediated by hedonistic motives for experiencing
anger and fear and emotion goals for experiencing anger and fear, as well as instrumental
motives for experiencing anger and fear and emotion goals for experiencing anger and
fear. However, the relation between psychopathy and emotion regulation was not serially
mediated by either hedonistic or instrumental motives for experiencing joy and emotion
goals for experiencing joy. These findings support the Fear-Enjoyment Hypothesis,
which suggests that people with psychopathic traits are more likely to interpret fear as
enjoyable and thus seek out fear-eliciting stimulation.
Keywords: psychopathy, emotion regulation, emotion goals, hedonistic motives,
instrumental motives
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Prologue
Psychopathy represents a constellation of extreme personality variants in
interpersonal, affective, and behavioral domains, that often manifest as antisocial
behavior (Spantidaki Kyriazi et al., 2021). Specific traits in psychopathy include
egocentricity, manipulativeness, deceitfulness, and superficial charm in the interpersonal

domain; callousness, superficial emotions, and a lack of empathy and remorse in the
affective domain; and impulsivity, irresponsibility, a lack of long-term goals, and a
proclivity for rule-violating behavior in the behavioral domain (Mededovic et al., 2017;
Miller et al., 2013). The behavioral domain may also be understood as two separate
dimensions, with one dimension focusing on general lifestyle characteristics (e.g.,
irresponsibility), and the other focusing on antisocial behavior (i.e., behavior that deviates
sharply from social norms, including social/moral transgressions and severe expressions
of aggressive behavior; American Psychological Association, n.d.; Neumann et al.,
2015). When combined, these traits result in harmful patterns of thinking and behaving
which inherently violate society’s expectations, norms, and values (Cleckley, 1955/2015;
Miller et al., 2001; Widiger & Lynam, 1998).
Criminality is a subset of antisociality, in that all criminal behavior is antisocial,
but not all antisocial behavior is criminal. More specifically, antisocial behavior requires
the general breaking of social rules and norms, which includes violations of the law,
whereas criminal behavior requires only the breaking of laws. Unlike criminality,
antisociality is an irremovable aspect of psychopathy that permeates into the other
characteristics that comprise the construct, such as interpersonal style, affective reactions,
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and general approach to life (Neumann et al., 2015). Given research demonstrating that
people with psychopathic personality traits have the capacity to experience emotions,
poor emotion regulation strategies and abilities, and maladaptive emotional motives and
goals, this study sought to investigate the process by which these maladaptive motives
and goals contribute to the observed dysfunction in emotional regulation.
Literature Review
Psychopathy: A Brief Overview
Despite having no stand-alone diagnosis in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013) or the
International Statistical Classification of Disease and Related Health Problems (ICD-11;
World Health Organization, 2019), psychopathy is often described as a personality
pathology or disorder due to its long-standing influence on the conceptualization of
disordered personalities for the first DSM (APA, 1952) and its subsequent revisions
(Crego & Widiger, 2014). Due to difficulties assessing for the cognitive and attitudinal
aspects of psychopathy, DSM-III developers created the diagnosis of Antisocial
Personality Disorder (ASPD) with the intention of capturing the construct of psychopathy
(Crego & Widiger, 2014). Specifically, ASPD is characterized as a pervasive pattern of
disregard for and violation of the rights of others that manifests as social irresponsibility
with exploitive, delinquent, and criminal behavior (APA, 2013). ASPD is distinguished
from psychopathy in that it focuses primarily on the presence of behavioral
manifestations, such as aggression, impulsivity, and violating others’ rights, which are
used to infer personality characteristics such as callousness, superficial charm,
deceitfulness, and arrogance (Crego & Widiger, 2014). Because people with these
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particular traits can be manipulative and have grandiose perceptions of themselves,
assessing the presence of these traits may be difficult without information from other
sources, which is why the presence of these traits must be inferred from behavior.
Additionally, because diagnostic criteria for ASPD do not require the presence of these
traits, ASPD can be considered distinct from psychopathy in that psychopathy requires
the presence of both the traits and behaviors. Furthermore, whereas nearly all people

categorized as psychopaths meet criteria for ASPD, only a small percentage of people
diagnosed with ASPD can be categorized as psychopaths (Hare, 1996).
One complication with interpreting the psychopathy literature is measurement of
the construct. Prior to 1990, most research on psychopathy measured the construct using
clinical checklists describing traits and behaviors associated with psychopathy, such as
those traits and behaviors described by clinician Cleckley (1955/2015) in his published
clinical observations of institutionalized psychopaths. However, this changed in 1990,
when Hare et al. published the Hare Psychopathy Checklist - Revised (PCL-R). The
PCL-R is a measure of psychopathy in criminal populations that is rated based on a
person’s lifetime functioning as evident in the assessment of a clinical interview and
institutional file information (Hare, 1996). The PCL-R measures psychopathy
categorically, as people with scores above 30 are considered to be psychopaths, whereas
those with scores 30 or below are considered not to be psychopaths. To this date, the
PCL-R has been revised once, is regarded as the most prominent and well-validated
measure of the psychopathy construct (Vien & Beech, 2006), and its revised version has
been used to develop and validate more recent measures of psychopathy. Another
complication with interpreting the psychopathy literature that stems from measurement of
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the construct is that some researchers have analyzed psychopathy as a categorical
variable, whereas others have analyzed psychopathy as a continuous variable. Earlier
research into psychopathy addressed the construct as categorical and investigated the
differences between psychopaths and non-psychopaths in offender samples, which is
evident in studies using the PCL-R. However, in the past two decades, researchers have
shifted their analytic strategy from categorical to continuous. This is due not only to the

development of research questions regarding psychopathy in the general population, but
also to the integration of trait dimensional models of personality pathology (Trull &
Durrett, 2005). Therefore, I differentiate the categorical from continuous analysis of
psychopathy by addressing sampled participants as being either “with psychopathic
personalities/categorized as psychopaths” (categorical analysis), or “with elevated levels
of psychopathic traits” (continuous analysis).
The most blatant and extreme behavioral manifestations of psychopathic traits
(and antisociality) involve criminal activity, especially violent crime (Hare & McPherson,
1984; Reidy et al., 2015). Approximately 15-25% of adult males within the criminal
justice system meet criteria for psychopathy, with criminal “psychopaths” being five
times more likely to commit and recidivate violent crimes compared to their nonpsychopathic counterparts (Kiehl & Hoffman, 2011; Reidy et al., 2015). Indeed,
psychopathy is the best predictor of violent crime and recidivism in the United States,
associated with a high risk of premature death, and often accompanied by a fast life
history strategy, which is characterized as a “relatively short-term focus and presentoriented attitude of taking risks or being aggressive in order to maximize immediate
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rewards… and little investment in social relationships or offspring” (Csatho & Birkas,
2018; Jonason et al., 2010; Maibom, 2008).
Because the most striking manifestation of psychopathic traits and antisociality is
criminal behavior, researchers have historically oversampled from offender populations,
which seems to disregard the people with psychopathic propensities who are not involved
in criminal activity, or not detected by the criminal justice system. Given the DSM-5’s

general classification of mental illness as being specified by levels of mild, moderate, and
severe impairment, it is reasonable to conceive that there are differential levels of severity
for psychopathy across modes (i.e., thoughts, attitudes, behaviors) and domains (i.e.,
familial, legal, occupational, social, and sexual), which may be persistent or intermittent
across time. Thus, it is more than likely that there are people with psychopathic
personalities within the general population at any given time who are either entirely
uninvolved, minimally involved, or highly and undetectably involved in criminal activity.
In fact, 54.5% and 59% of violent crimes went unsolved and unreported in 2019 (Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Report, 2019; Morgan & Truman, 2020)
respectively, which demonstrates the potential for undetected individuals with
psychopathic personalities to not only have committed a portion of these crimes, but also
to continue committing these types of crime. Furthermore, Kiehl and Hoffman (2011)
estimate that 1% of adult males in the general U.S. population in 2011 (approximately
1.15 million males) would meet criteria for psychopathy.
Nevertheless, more moderate behavioral manifestations of psychopathy may also
present concerns within interpersonal, relational, and occupational domains, as well as
within the realm of public health and safety. Some of these moderate manifestations
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include aggression, coercion, deviant workplace behavior, hypersexuality and risky sex,
infidelity, and substance abuse in both males and females (Book et al., 2019; Brewer et
al., 2015; Carre et al., 2018; Hoffman & Verona, 2019; Jones & Weiser, 2014; Kastner &
Sellbom, 2012; Seibert et al., 2011). Like criminal activity, these behaviors result in
destructive outcomes for all parties involved. For example, the repeated infidelity, use of
manipulation, and lesser desire for and experience of intimacy with romantic partners
observed in males and females with psychopathic traits may lead to reduced satisfaction,
quality, and commitment in their romantic relationships, and even dissolution and divorce
(Ali & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2010; Jonason et al., 2013; Jones & Weiser, 2014; Smith et
al., 2014; Weiss et al., 2018). In addition, consistently deviant workplace behavior, such
as bullying and counterproductivity, leads to career difficulties for males and females
with elevated levels of psychopathic traits (Paleczek et al., 2018), as well as a reduction
of workplace morale, employee well-being, productivity, and profitability for their
coworkers and employers (Boddy, 2014). As for general health and public safety,
psychopathy’s association with hypersexuality and risky sex places people with
heightened levels of psychopathic traits at acute risk for contracting and disseminating
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and other sexually transmitted diseases, as risky
sex is one of the strongest predictors of contracting HIV (Hoyle et al., 2000). Thus,
psychopathy presents a variety of potential risks not limited to crime.
Sex Differences in Psychopathy. Because the most obvious behavioral
manifestation of psychopathy is criminal behavior, researchers have historically
neglected investigating psychopathy within non-offending populations, and within
populations for which criminal behavior is less likely. One such group being cisgender
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females, who commit crimes at a much lower rate than cisgender males (Steffensmeier &
Allan, 1996). However, as described in detail above, people categorized as psychopaths
and those with elevated levels of psychopathic traits do not always engage in criminal
behavior, and even when they do, they are not always detected by the criminal justice
system. Thus, in the past three decades, researchers have begun investigating
psychopathy not only within female offender samples, but also within general population
samples.
Another problem regarding research on sex and gender differences in
psychopathy is that researchers in the broader psychological community have done a poor
job at distinguishing between biological sex assigned at birth and gender identity. Often,
researchers have used and continue to use the terms “sex” and “gender” interchangeably,
which makes it difficult to interpret results in a meaningful way (Hartung & Lefler,
2019). This also makes it difficult to build a theoretical framework for why certain
behaviors may be indicative of psychopathology in some groups, but not others. Given
the major problem of not distinguishing sex and gender in research, Hartung and Lefler
(2019) recommend that researchers exercise clarity and consistency when distinguishing
between the two. Therefore, I will be using the terms “male” and “female” throughout
this paper to describe biological sex assigned at birth, and will refrain from discussing
gender identity, as most research on psychopathy has not addressed its potential
influence.
Research in the field of psychopathy indicates that both males and females are
capable of exhibiting psychopathic traits, that there are similarities in the expression of
psychopathic traits, and that there also are significant differences in the expression of
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psychopathic traits. For example, both males and females with elevated levels of
psychopathic traits demonstrate more aggression than those with lower levels of
psychopathic traits. Specifically, both males and females with psychopathic personalities
engage in various forms of aggression, with females demonstrating more relational
aggression than males, and males demonstrating more physical aggression than females
(Colins et al., 2017). In addition, females with elevated levels of psychopathy are more

likely to engage in indirect aggression than their male counterparts, which may be due to
the greater risk of harm for females engaging in aggressive behavior (Thomson et al.,
2019). Males and females with elevated levels of psychopathy also display similarities
and differences in the types of crime for which they commit, and the age at which they
were first convicted. For instance, both males and females with elevated levels of
psychopathy commit crimes such as vandalism, assault (threatening violence), selling
drugs, and intimate partner violence (Declerq et al., 2015; de Vogel & Lancel, 2016).
Despite these similarities, males with elevated psychopathic traits have more incidents of
physical, verbal, and sexual violence, whereas females have more incidents of property
crimes such as theft and fraud, as well as prostitution (de Vogel & Lancel, 2016).
Furthermore, compared to females with elevated levels of psychopathic traits, males with
elevated levels of psychopathic traits score higher on juvenile delinquency and are older
in age at their first conviction, but have less instances of running away (Rogstad &
Rogers, 2008).
The research indicates that there are also similarities and differences in other
psychiatric symptoms and presentations of psychopathy between the sexes. Females
categorized as psychopaths are more likely to engage in self-destructive and self-harming
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behaviors, such as attempting suicide, compared to their male counterparts (de Vogel &
Lancel, 2016). In addition, both males and females categorized as psychopaths are more
likely to have internalizing problems than non-psychopathic males and females; however,
females with psychopathic personalities demonstrate higher rates of Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder (PTSD) and anxiety disorders than their male counterparts. Females with
psychopathic personalities are also more likely to present as emotionally labile, angry,

and hostile than males with psychopathic personalities (Colins et al., 2017). Furthermore,
when a sample of clinical psychologists were asked to describe prototypical presentations
of psychopathy in males and females , the most common symptoms associated with
males were self-aggrandizing, sense of invulnerability, self-centered, domineering,
reckless, disruptive, aggressive, lacks anxiety, and is unempathetic, whereas the most
common symptoms associated with females were manipulative, lacks emotional stability,
and unstable self-concept (Kreis & Cooke, 2011). Although the symptoms “sense of
invulnerability” for males and “unstable self-concept” for females are markedly different,
they may share the same core, meaning that both males and females with psychopathic
personalities may have a fragile self-concept which manifests in males as an inflated
sense of invulnerability, and in females as a labile sense of self (Kreis & Cooke, 2011).
Another important finding from the study by Kreis and Cooke (2011) is that clinical
psychologists also described females with prototypical presentations of psychopathy as
being more dependent (i.e., needy, helpless, vulnerable) than their male counterparts,
which the authors suggest may be due to females employing female stereotypes to exploit
others. Walsh et al. (2019) found that both males and females with psychopathic
personalities demonstrated attachment insecurity and dependence on others. However,
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males with psychopathic personalities were found to be more anxiously attached than
their non-psychopathic male counterparts, whereas females with psychopathic
personalities were found to be equally as anxiously attached as their non-psychopathic
female counterparts, which may be due to the social taboo of dependence in men, and the
social acceptability of dependence in females (Walsh et al., 2019).
Males and females with psychopathic traits also exhibit similarities and

differences in addiction, occupational problems, and cognition. Regarding addiction,
males and females with elevated levels of psychopathy engage in more alcohol and drug
abuse than those with lower levels of psychopathy, but unlike females, males also display
more problems with gambling (Miller et al., 2011; Sellbom et al., 2016). As for
occupational troubles, males and females categorized as psychopaths experience
employment problems, such as unemployment, at similar rates (de Vogel & Lancel,
2016). Lastly, males and females with elevated levels of psychopathy may have
significant differences in cognition, such as attention, recognition, processing, and
memory. For example, females with elevated levels of psychopathic traits were found to
be better than their male counterparts at attending to goal-relevant information, ignoring
peripheral threat information, recognizing emotional information, and remembering
emotional information, although they still displayed deficits compared to females with
lower levels of psychopathic traits (Efferson & Glenn, 2018). Efferson and Glenn (2018)
also found that females with elevated levels of psychopathy also demonstrated no deficits
in response perseveration, or the ability to inhibit a response to an aversive stimulus that
was previously rewarded, for which males with elevated levels of psychopathy
continuously demonstrate. The authors suggest that the differences in cognition,
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especially those pertaining to recognizing and remembering emotional information, may
be due to socialization practices and gender roles for females compared to males, in that
females are raised to be more attentive to emotional information than males.
The above findings highlight some of the significant similarities and differences
among males and females with elevated levels of psychopathy, and the potential
explanations for them, although this review is not exhaustive. An important takeaway
from these findings is that psychopathy exists in both males and females, and manifests
very similarly in some ways, and very differently in other ways. However, because
research on psychopathy in females is more scarce than that in males, and reviews on sex
differences in psychopathy is even more scarce still, more research is needed for a better
understanding of the clinical picture of psychopathy in both sexes. Given the need for
research differentiating the manifestation of psychopathic traits in males and females, this
project will build on the greater accumulation of research with an all-male sample, which
will provide the opportunity for future replication studies with an all-female sample.
Relevant Problems Within the Psychopathy Literature. Despite decades of
research, we still do not understand psychopathy well-enough for a stand-alone diagnosis
in the DSM-5, nor a single treatment plan with positive outcomes (Vien & Beech, 2006).
These large gaps in the research are the result of at least two factors. First, people with
psychopathic personalities are considered to be narcissistic with carefree attitudes about
their own lives and the lives of others, they fail to take responsibility for their actions, and
they externalize the blame for their actions (Hare & Neumann, 2008). As such, it is
logical to assert that people with psychopathic personalities fail to perceive any problems
in their lives as consequences of their behavior worth significant concern. Subsequently,
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it stands to reason that they do not seek out therapy or behavioral modification, and
instead are mandated to treatment by the court or placed in intervention programs at
correctional facilities. Additionally, even when people with psychopathic personalities
are enrolled in treatment interventions, they demonstrate less clinical improvement, lower
levels of motivation, and higher rates of attrition than people without psychopathic
personalities (Ogloff et al., 1990).
Second, the psychopathy literature has demonstrated a major problem within the
field: misinterpretation of seminal clinical observations. Conceptualizations emphasizing
an inability of experiencing emotions as a central component of psychopathy have
misinterpreted the criterion “general poverty in major affective regions'' coined by
clinician Cleckley in writings on his clinical observations of categorized psychopaths
within in-patient treatment facilities (Cleckley, 1955/2015). More specifically, the
meaning of the word “poverty” has been understood as synonymous with words such as
inability and incapacity, rather than insufficiency. In fact, Cleckley was concerned with
the quality of their emotional experiences, as in “how long-lasting these states are, how
consistent, and how ‘mature’ their expression” (Marsh, 2013, p. 4). These
misinterpretations naturally led to the development of research projects aimed at
measuring emotional responding in people with psychopathic personalities, which
initially garnered support for theories of emotional incapacity and subsequently became a
popular concept in mass media. Despite the initial support, recent meta-analyses and
literature reviews revealed this predominant conceptualization to be at odds with the
amalgamation of empirical research. Affectively, cognitively, and physiologically, males
and females with psychopathic personalities experience a range of emotions, including
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anger, fear, and excitement (Kosson et al., 2016; Marsh, 2013; see below for further
discussion). These findings suggest that existing theories related to psychopathy and
antisocial behavior must be reconsidered and updated to include the potential influence of
constructs previously considered irrelevant.
Emotion Regulation, Response Modulation & Psychopathy
One construct previously considered irrelevant to psychopathy, but which now

offers a potential explanation, is emotion regulation, which refers to the
appropriate/adaptive monitoring, evaluating, and automatic or controlled manipulation of
the presence and/or intensity of the components of an emotional response (e.g., subjective
experience, physiological activity, or behavior; Gross & Thompson, 2007; Thompson,
1994). On the other hand, maladaptive emotion regulation (i.e., emotion dysregulation)
refers to unsuccessful attempts at changing an emotional response in the desired way,
applying strategies for regulation in a rigid manner inconsistent with long-term goals,
long-term costs of an emotional response outweighing the short-term influences on
emotion, or attempts to suppress or resist emotional experiences which result in
maladaptive secondary emotional responses (Werner & Gross, 2010). Emotion
dysregulation in males and females has been linked to forms of externalizing behaviors
also associated with psychopathy, such as aggression and impulsivity (Garofalo &
Neumann, 2018), intimate partner violence (Gratz & Roemer, 2003), and substance abuse
(Bjureberg et al., 2016; Cooper et al., 1995; Gratz & Roemer, 2003; Hayes et al., 1996;
Tull et al., 2015). In males, emotion dysregulation is also associated with risky sex (Tull
et al., 2012), and in females, emotion dysregulation is also associated with non-suicidal
self-injury/deliberate self-harm (Gratz & Roemer, 2008), behaviors which are also

14
associated with psychopathic traits. In addition, emotion dysregulation has been
identified as a transdiagnostic indicator of mental illness (Kring & Sloan, 2009), and is
associated with eating disorders (Lavender et al., 2014; Segal & Golan, 2016; Whiteside
et al., 2007), posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD; Cloitre, 1998; Tull et al., 2007),
borderline personality disorder (BPD; Gratz et al., 2006), generalized anxiety disorder
(GAD; Mennin et al., 2002; Salters-Pedneault et al., 2006), major depression (Ehring et

al., 2010), and bipolar disorder (Bjureberg et al., 2016; Gratz & Roemer, 2003; Tamir &
Millgram, 2017). Thus, these findings point to the importance of emotion dysregulation
as a hallmark feature for a variety of diagnoses, which, given its characterization as a
personality pathology, could extend to psychopathy.
The potential relevance of emotion dysregulation to psychopathy has only gained
empirical and theoretical traction in the past decade, primarily due to the discounting of
popular conceptualizations that emphasize an inability to experience emotions as a core
feature of psychopathy. Recent evidence, literature reviews, and meta-analyses indicate
that males and females with elevated levels of psychopathic traits subjectively and
physiologically experience anger at a rate similar to or greater than controls (Blackburn
& Lee-Evans, 1985; Dawel et al., 2012; Hicks & Patrick, 2006; Kosson et al., 2016;
Marsh, 2013; Marsh & Blair, 2008; Marsh et al., 2011), and appropriate anxiety and fear
responses when attending to relevant stimuli (Derefinko, 2014; Hare & Neumann, 2008;
Kosson et al., 2016; Marsh, 2013). However, they also demonstrate reduced anxiety and
fear responses, but only when not attending to relevant stimuli (Hoppenbrouwers et al.,
2016). Taken together, these findings suggest that people with psychopathic personalities
are not impaired in their ability to experience emotions, but rather that they have a
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deficiency in the process of attending to those emotions, which in turn influences the
process involved in the regulating of emotions.
The response modulation (RM) hypothesis (Newman & Lorenz, 2003) suggests
that people with psychopathic personalities may experience deficiencies in modulating
behavioral and emotional responses due to a difficulty in switching attention between two
stimuli. Therefore, when engaged in goal-pursuit, people with psychopathic personalities

do not recognize or respond to contextual cues or emotionally-laden stimuli that are
peripheral to the task at hand. For example, Lykken (1957) found that males with
psychopathic personalities demonstrate little to no learning of passive avoidance
contingencies (i.e., electric shocks for inhibiting errored responses) when the instructed
task was to learn a sequence of responses for moving through a maze. Extending these
findings, Newman and Kosson (1986) observed that males with psychopathic
personalities were as good as controls in an avoid-punishment condition, but significantly
worse than controls in switching attention in a reward-and-punishment condition. In
addition, males with psychopathic personalities responded much faster than participants
without psychopathic personalities in tasks requiring the ignoring of peripheral stimuli
(e.g., Stroop paradigm; Newman et al., 1997; Schmitt, 2000).
Because males with psychopathic traits experience deficiencies in switching
attention from a primary task or stimulus to a peripheral one, they are also less likely to
experience or express emotions to emotionally-salient but peripheral stimuli. For
instance, although most people are generally quicker at identifying both emotionallyladen (vs. affectively-neutral; Dewhurst & Parry, 2000) and high-frequency (vs. lowfrequency; Rajaram & Neely, 1992) words, males with psychopathic personalities did not
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experience this advantage, as they were significantly slower than controls at identifying
these word-types (Lorenz & Newman, 2001; Williamson et al., 1991). Additionally,
males with psychopathic personalities exhibit lower levels of startle response to noise
probes when viewing unpleasant slides and greater levels of startle response to noise
probes when viewing neutral slides, whereas the opposite is true for most people,
generally speaking (Patrick et al., 1993). Males with psychopathic personalities also

exhibit lower startle responses than controls while viewing slides depicting mutilation,
assault, threat, and thrill (Levenston et al., 2000). These findings for males, combined
with evidence demonstrating an inverse relation between startle potentiation and the
degree of attention afforded to a slide for males and females (i.e., greater startle related to
lower attention; Bradley et al., 1993), suggest that the reduced startle response observed
in males with psychopathic personalities is the result of their investing substantial
attention into viewing the content of a slide, rather than the result of an inability to
experience fear.
The concept of switching attention within the psychopathy literature is similar to
that of set shifting within the Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD)
literature. ADHD is classified in DSM-5 as a neurodevelopmental disorder characterized
by developmentally extreme and pervasive manifestations of inattention and/or
hyperactivity/impulsivity (APA, 2013; Hinshaw et al., 2021). In the context of ADHD,
set shifting is defined as the ability to quickly and efficiently switch back and forth
between mental sets or multiple tasks (Monsell, 1996 as cited in Rohlf et al., 2011). Set
shifting is conceptualized as a component of executive functioning (EF), which is an
umbrella term that refers to cognitive abilities involved in self-regulation and goal-
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directed persistence, and is linked to activation in the prefrontal cortex (Barkley, 1997;
Moriguchi & Hiraki, 2013). According to Barkley (1997), EF may manifest as publicly
observable or instead as highly internalized in the form of self-directed actions, the
organization of behavioral contingencies across time, the use of self-directed speech,
rules, or plans, deferred gratification, and goal-directed, future-oriented, purposive, or
intentional actions. People with ADHD often experience deficits in EF and have reduced

activation in their prefrontal cortex (Moriguchi & Hiraki, 2013).
Interestingly, the prefrontal cortex is also associated with psychopathic traits. In a
systematic review of research examining the neural correlates of psychopathy, Johanson
et al. (2020) found that psychopathy (examined categorically and continuously) was
associated with reduced activity, grey matter volume, and functional connectivity in the
prefrontal cortex. Additionally, both males and females categorized as psychopaths report
more ADHD symptoms than males and females categorized as non-psychopaths, and
adolescents and adults with a diagnosis of ADHD report more psychopathic traits than
adolescents and adults without a diagnosis of ADHD (Colins et al., 2017; Eisenbarth et
al., 2008; Fowler et al., 2009). According to Pauli et al. (2019), the link between ADHD
and psychopathy may be understood as a developmental pathway, whereby a diagnosis of
ADHD, coupled with pervasive conduct problems, places a child at increased risk of
developing psychopathy in adulthood. More research is needed to address this
developmental pathway and overlap between ADHD and psychopathic traits.
The deficiencies in switching attention observed in people with psychopathic
personalities may operate in the opposite direction of that previously discussed, with
these individuals exhibiting difficulties shifting attention away from primary,
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emotionally-salient stimuli and toward peripheral tasks. Having difficulty in regulating
one’s emotions in order to engage in peripheral goal-related tasks, lacking strategies and
believing nothing can be done to regulate one’s emotions when upset, and having
difficulty controlling one’s behavior when upset are three of six theorized dimensions of
emotion dysregulation (Gratz & Roemer, 2003). In accordance with the RM hypothesis,
these dimensions of emotion dysregulation could be associated with psychopathy. Indeed,

both males and females with elevated levels of psychopathic traits demonstrate difficulty
with regulating emotions along these three dimensions (Garofalo et al., 2018, 2020).
Regardless of whether emotion dysregulation is analyzed as a multidimensional or
unidimensional construct, psychopathy total scores for both males and females (as
conceptualized by the PCL-R) continue to demonstrate positive associations with
emotion dysregulation (Garofalo et al., 2018, 2019, 2020), with Factor 2 traits
demonstrating poorer emotion regulation (and emotional intelligence) than Factor 1 traits
in some studies with mixed-gender samples (Ali et al., 2009; Grieve & Mahar, 2010;
Maxwell et al., 2017; Miller et al., 2010; Vidal et al., 2010), and the four facets
demonstrating relatively similar levels of emotion dysregulation in others (Garofalo et al.,
2018, 2019, 2020). Hence, it appears that emotion dysregulation is an important
consideration with regard to the psychopathic personality.
A Motivational Framework for Emotion Regulation in Psychopathy
With mounting evidence demonstrating that attention is an important factor for
understanding the emotional responses and regulation of people with psychopathic
personalities, a logical next step would be to address factors that affect attention, such as
motivation. Previous research has demonstrated the influence of motivation on attention
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in the general population (Calcott & Berkman, 2014; Di Nocera et al., 2014; Norman &
Shallice, 1986; Posner et al., 1980), in addition to the results discussed above. Although
people with psychopathic personalities are characterized as being poor at setting and
adhering to long-term goals (Cleckley, 1955/2015), this does not necessarily mean that
they are not goal-oriented in the short-term. The above findings (e.g., Schmitt, 2000),
which demonstrate that males with psychopathic personalities have difficulty switching

attention while engaged in a particular task, are also evidence suggesting that these
individuals are more situationally goal-oriented than the average person. Therefore, it
may be the lack of motivation for processing, rather than the processing itself, which is
deficient in their difficulty modulating behavior and managing emotional responses. It is
possible that males with psychopathic traits experience anger to a greater or similar
extent compared to controls because they are motivated to attend to feelings of anger and
anger-inducing stimuli.
Because the purpose of the emotion regulation process is to attain a goal, and
therefore emotion regulation is always motivated (Tamir & Millgram, 2017), people with
psychopathic personalities could want to experience anger because they think it will help
them achieve something (Tamir, 2009), or it could be that they want to feel a certain way,
affectively (i.e., emotion goal, desired affective state; Tamir & Gutentag, 2017; Tamir,
2016). In both cases, an emotional state can influence whether the goal is obtained or not.
For instance, a person who is sad may have difficulty expressing enthusiasm (i.e.,
emotion goal) upon meeting new people, which could reduce their likelihood of making
friends (i.e., achievement goal). The importance of motivation to the emotion regulation
process is evidenced by findings showing that people will choose to intentionally express

20
or not express an emotion if they believe it will result in some desired or undesired
outcome (Cameron & Payne, 2011; Forgas, 2013). Thus, it appears motivation may be as
important as attention for emotion regulation in people with elevated levels of
psychopathic traits.
Emotion Goals for Emotion Regulation
Given the assertion that emotion regulation is a process motivated by achievement

goals and desired emotional states (i.e., emotion goals), one can infer that emotion
dysregulation, generally speaking, is similarly motivated, but by maladaptive desires. A
hedonistic approach to emotion regulation suggests that people want to maximize
pleasure and minimize pain. Being that psychopathology and psychopathy alike are
associated with emotion dysregulation, evidence supporting the presence of maladaptive
emotion goals in psychopathology suggests a logical potential for the presence of
maladaptive emotion goals in psychopathy as well.
That is, one would expect participants with mood disorders to demonstrate
different preferences for experiencing emotions compared to controls. In support of this
claim, participants with clinical depression reported a significantly greater preference for
sadness, reported a significantly lower preference for happiness, and chose to view
significantly more sadness-inducing images compared to non-depressed participants,
regardless of their current emotional state (Millgram et al., 2015). Additionally,
depressed participants chose sad music significantly more than non-depressed
participants and significantly more than happy music; they also chose to increase their
emotional reactivity to sad images significantly more than non-depressed participants,
and subsequently experienced more intense sadness. These results suggest not only that
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people with clinical depression are more motivated to experience sadness, but also that
this motivation contributes to their emotion regulatory process and likely results in the
maintenance of their depressive state.
The suggestion that depression is partly maintained by a desire for experiencing
sadness is congruent with the Behavioral Concordance Model (Cote & Moskowitz,
1998), which suggests that people prefer consistent, rather than inconsistent, experiences.

This trait-consistent approach is congruent with evidence demonstrating that extraverts,
who reportedly experience greater levels of pleasant emotions compared to introverts
(Larsen & Augustine, 2008), have a much stronger desire for pleasant emotions and a
greater dislike for unpleasant emotions compared to introverts (Rusting & Larsen, 1995).
Such consistency preferences may be held due to habit or the comfort of familiarity; or,
these preferences may be held in order to elicit desired outcomes (i.e., instrumental
motives).
Generally speaking, people have a strong preference for pleasant affective states
and a strong dislike for unpleasant affective states (Kampfe & Mitte, 2009), a notion
which supports a hedonistic approach to emotion regulation. However, in situations in
which a goal is being pursued, an instrumental approach may be more appropriate. That
is, desired affective states are influenced by the type of goal being pursued, and the utility
for which an affective state is believed to aid in successful goal attainment. For instance,
participants who expected to play an approach-oriented computer game reported a greater
preference for excitement-inducing activities, whereas participants who expected to play
an avoidance-oriented game reported a greater preference for fear-inducing activities
(Tamir & Ford, 2009). In addition, expecting to play an approach-oriented game was
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associated with a greater perceived utility of excitement, expecting to play an avoidanceoriented game was associated with a greater perceived utility of fear, and expecting to
play a confrontation-oriented game was associated with a greater perceived utility of
anger (Tamir & Ford, 2009). These results support the notion that situational demands
and instrumental considerations influence preferences for affective states, but they do not
address the interaction with personality traits.

As previously discussed, desired affective states are influenced by situational goal
pursuit and personality. However, there is also an interaction between the type of goal
being pursued and trait personality, which together influence preferences for desired
affective states. In support of this claim, extraverts demonstrate stronger preferences for
happiness and happiness-activities compared to introverts, but only in the context of
effortful situations (Tamir, 2009). When considered through the lens of a trait-consistent
approach, this finding suggests that when engaged in an effortful task, people prefer
levels of happiness for which they are more accustomed to experiencing.
Because psychopathy is a personality pathology linked with emotion
dysregulation, it is reasonable to infer that individuals with elevated psychopathic traits
have maladaptive emotion goals consistent with their personality and similar to those
observed in those with clinical depression. From a trait-consistent perspective, it is
possible that the poor emotion regulation associated with psychopathy is a function of the
interaction between their maladaptive emotion goals and habitual experiences. For
instance, it has been suggested that the affective facet, which is characterized by a lack of
concern for others, a lack of remorse or guilt, a failure to take responsibility for one’s
actions, and shallow affect, is associated with emotional suppression (Casey et al., 2013;
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Nentjes et al., 2016). Thus, one would expect psychopathy (and the affective traits more
specifically) to be generally associated with minimal-to-no desire for pleasant emotions
such as happiness, empathy, and love. Additionally, psychopathy is associated with
pathological lying and manipulation, general risk-taking behavior, aggression, and
impulsivity, all of which typically elicit feelings of fear. Given evidence demonstrating
that people with psychopathic personalities experience fear affectively, cognitively, and

physiologically, albeit to a lesser extent than the general population (Kosson et al., 2016),
a reasonable explanation for the risk-taking behaviors associated with psychopathy exists
in the Fear-Enjoyment Hypothesis (Hosker-Field et al., 2016), which states that people
with psychopathic traits interpret fear as enjoyable, and thus have a desire to experience
fear. Desiring the experience of fear because it is perceived as pleasant is consistent with
a hedonistic motivation for regulating emotions.
This perspective is consistent with the circumplex model of affect (Russell, 1980),
which asserts that emotions are conceptualized along two interacting, bipolar dimensions.
The first dimension is valence, which represents the degree to which an emotion is
perceived as pleasurable or displeasurable, and the second dimension is arousal, which
represents the degree to which an emotion activates or deactivates the autonomic nervous
system (Posner et al., 2008). According to this model, each emotion is conceptualized
with varying degrees of both valence and arousal. For example, an emotion such as joy is
typically perceived as pleasant and is physiologically activating, whereas an emotion
such as sadness is typically perceived as unpleasant and is physiologically deactivating.
If people with elevated levels of psychopathic traits generally interpret fear as enjoyable,
then they could also interpret fear (or other negative emotions, such as anger) as useful in
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contexts in which most people would interpret fear as a hindrance or as less useful than
other, positive emotions. Recent evidence demonstrates that males and females with
elevated levels of psychopathic traits indeed hold maladaptive emotion goals and
motives, such as having general preferences for anger and fear, along with a perceived
pleasantness (i.e., enjoyment) and perceived utility for anger and fear (Spantidaki Kyriazi
et al., 2021). Not only that, but Spantidaki Kyriazi et al. (2021) found that hedonistic and
instrumental motives mediated the relation between psychopathic traits and emotion
goals for anger, fear, and joy. However, emotion goals and motives have yet to be
investigated alongside emotion regulation as a serial mediation, and therefore, by
combining the Fear-Enjoyment Hypothesis with motivational and trait-consistent
approaches to emotion regulation, this study seeks to address this gap in the literature.
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Chapter 2: Method
The Current Study
Using a motivational framework for emotion regulation in conjunction with the
Fear-Enjoyment Hypothesis of psychopathy, which states that people with psychopathic
personalities interpret fear as pleasurable rather than aversive, the current study aimed to
investigate the instrumental and hedonistic motivations for setting emotion goals in males

with elevated levels of psychopathic traits, as well as the interaction effects of these
motives and goals on emotion regulation. Specifically, I examined emotion goals as a
mediator between psychopathic traits and emotion regulation. In line with previous
research demonstrating that psychopathic traits are related to poor emotion regulation and
maladaptive emotion goals (i.e., desire for experiencing anger and fear with no desire for
experiencing joy), I hypothesized that total psychopathy scores would be positively
related to emotion dysregulation, and that this relation would be explained by the
maladaptive emotion goals set for both positive and negative emotions. I expected to find
that total psychopathy scores would be positively correlated with emotion goals for anger
and fear, and negatively correlated with emotion goals for joy.
In addition, I examined the perceived utility (i.e., instrumental motive) and
perceived pleasantness (i.e., hedonistic motive) of emotions as two variables that mediate
the relation between psychopathic traits and emotion goals, with greater perceived utility
and perceived pleasantness of negative emotions being associated with more maladaptive
emotion goals for males with greater levels of psychopathic traits. In accordance with
previous findings, I expected to find that the perceived utility and perceived pleasantness
of anger, fear, and joy would mediate the relation between psychopathic traits and
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emotion goals for anger, fear, and joy. Based on empirical findings, I expected to find
that total psychopathy scores would be positively correlated with the perceived utility of
anger and fear, negatively correlated with the perceived utility of joy, positively
correlated with the perceived pleasantness of anger and fear, and negatively correlated
with the perceived pleasantness of joy.
Lastly, I investigated the relation between psychopathic traits and emotion

regulation as a serial mediation, with instrumental and hedonistic motives mediating the
relation between psychopathic traits and emotion goals, and emotion goals mediating the
relation between psychopathic traits and emotion regulation.
Participants
Seven-hundred and seventy-five males participated in the study, which was
approved by the University of Northern Iowa’s Institutional Review Board (IRB).
Participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), and compensated
$1.00. Of the 775 participants that reported their assigned sex at birth as male, seven
reported their gender identity as non-binary, and one reported their gender identity as
woman. These participants were retained in analyses as gender identity is considered
distinct from assigned sex at birth. The majority of participants identified their race as
White or European American (72.8%), followed by Black or African American (9.2%),
Asian or Asian American (7.6%), Hispanic/Latinx (4.6%), and American Indian or
Alaska Native (.4%). Participants’ average age was 41.4 years old. Most participants
reported their highest level of education received as Bachelor’s degree (40.4%), followed
by a Graduate degree (14.6%), some education after high school but no (15.9%), an
Associate’s degree (11.8%), a high school degree or GED (8.6%), Vocational training
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(3.1%), Trade certification (2.6%), and no high school degree (.1%). Twenty-one percent
of participants reported their annual household income before taxes as $100,000 or more,
followed by $30,000 – less than $50,000 (20%), $50,000 – less than $70,000 (19.8%),
$70,000 – less than $100,000 (18.4%), $10,000 – less than $30,000 (14.7%), and less
than $10,000 (5.6%). Demographic characteristics of study participants is reported in
Table 1.
Recruitment
Because the base rate of psychopathic traits in the general population is extremely
low, achieving an MTurk sample with elevated levels of psychopathy was a concern. To
address this concern, I used a recruitment strategy developed by Widom (1977), which
has shown repeated success in sampling people with elevated levels of psychopathic traits
(as cited in Mullins-Sweatt et al., 2010). The recruitment script was modified for online
use and is shown below.
“Wanted: charming, aggressive, carefree people who are impulsively
irresponsible but are good at handling people and at looking after number one. If
these traits don’t apply to you, worry not! You may still participate. We are
conducting an online survey about personality and emotions which will take
approximately 20 minutes to complete. Respondents will receive $1.00 for
participation. If interested, please click the link below.”
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Table 1
Demographic Characteristics of Study Participants
Characteristic
Gender Identity
Man
Woman
Non-binary
Race/Ethnicity
American Indian or Alaska Native
Asian or Asian American
Black or African American
Hispanic/Latinx
Native American or Other Pacific Islander
White or European American
Age
Education Level
No high school degree
Grade 12 or GED
Some edu after high school, no degree/award
Trade certification
Vocational training
Associate’s degree
Bachelor’s degree
Graduate degree
Annual Household Income
Less than $10,000
$10,000 to less than $30,000
$30,000 to less than $50,000
$50,000 to less than $70,000
$70,000 to less than $100,000
$100,000 or more

M

SD

%

-

-

99
.10
.90

41.4

13.28

.40
7.6
9.2
4.6
72.8
-

-

-

.10
8.6
15.9
2.6
3.1
11.8
40.4
17.6

-

-

5.6
14.7
20.5
19.8
18.4
21

Note: M = Mean, SD = Standard Deviation, % = Percent of sample.
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Procedure
Participants were recruited online via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to
participate in a survey via Qualtrics (https://www.qualtrics.com). Once participants
clicked the provided study link and were redirected to Qualtrics, they were presented with
an informed consent (see Appendix B). Following informed consent, they completed
each of the measures, which were counterbalanced and randomized in order to control for
potential presentation-order effects. Next, participants were presented with questions
regarding their demographic information, followed by an open-ended item which offers
the opportunity to leave comments for the researcher. Lastly, participants were presented
with a debriefing (see Appendix C) which thanked them for their participation and
provided contact information for the researchers and IRB Administrators.
Measures
Self-Report Psychopathy Scale—Short Form
The Self-Report Psychopathy Scale-SF (SRP-SF; Paulhus et al., 2016) is a
multifaceted self-report scale used to measure psychopathic traits. This measure contains
29 items (e.g., “It’s fun to see how far you can push people before they get upset”)
presented on a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = Disagree strongly, 5 = Agree strongly). The
SRP-SF was modeled after the PCL-R, and produces scores for each of the four facets
(i.e., interpersonal, affective, lifestyle, and antisocial), as well as a total score. The
interpersonal facet measures superficial charm, grandiose sense of self-worth,
pathological lying, and manipulative tendencies. The affective facet measures lack of
remorse or guilt, shallow affect, callousness/lack of empathy, and failure to accept
responsibility for one’s actions. The lifestyle facet measures need for stimulation,
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parasitic lifestyle, impulsivity, and irresponsibility. The antisocial facet measures poor
behavioral controls, early behavioral problems, juvenile delinquency, and general lawbreaking behavior. The SRP-SF has previously demonstrated good validity across
populations (Seara-Cardoso et al., 2020). The SRP-SF demonstrated excellents internal
reliability in this sample (α = .92). See Appendix A for the full measure.
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale – 16

The Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale – 16 (DERS-16; Bjureberg et al.,
2016) is a self-report measure of difficulties with regulating emotions. This measure
contains 16 items (e.g., “When I am upset, I become out of control”) presented on a 5point Likert-type scale (1 = Almost never, 5 = Almost always). The DERS-16 has
demonstrated good construct validity (Bjureberg et al., 2016; Garofalo et al., 2019). In
this sample, the DERS-16 demonstrated excellent internal reliability (α = .95). See
Appendix B for the full measure.
Affect Valuation Index
To measure emotion goals, I used a modified version of the Affect Valuation
Index (AVI; Tsai et al., 2006), which is a self-report measure of ideal affect (affective
states that people value or ideally want to feel), and actual affect (affective states that
people actually feel). Because the aim of this project was to investigate emotion goals,
only the item pertaining to ideal affect was used. Participants were presented with a list of
12 words that describe feelings (e.g., delighted, hostile, joyful, scared), and rated how
often they would ideally like to have those feelings over the course of a typical week on a
5-point Likert-type scale (1 = Never, 5 = All the time). The AVI has been analyzed
previously for emotional valence, resulting in a positive emotions score and negative
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emotions score; however, Tsai et al. (2006) assert that this measure can also be analyzed
in a variety of ways, such as analyzing for specific emotions. Thus, four of the 12
descriptor words were averaged to measure emotion goals for anger (i.e., hostile, angry,
irritated, mad), four were averaged to measure emotion goals for fear (i.e., scared, fearful,
afraid, nervous), and four were averaged to measure emotion goals for joy (i.e., delighted,
joyful, happy, cheerful). The AVI has demonstrated good construct and discriminant

validity (Tsai et al., 2006). The AVI subscales for anger (α = .88) and fear (α = .89)
demonstrated good internal reliability in this sample, whereas the subscale for joy (α =
.91) demonstrated excellent internal reliability in this sample. See Appendix C for the full
measure.
Perceived Affect Utility Scale–Revised
To measure instrumental motives, I used a modified version of the Perceived
Affect Utility Scale-Revised (PAUse-r; Chow et al., 2017), which is a self-report measure
of how useful an emotion is for goal attainment. I reduced the PAUse-r instructions in
order to keep the survey duration to less than 15 minutes. Like with the AVI, participants
were presented with a list of 12 words that describe feelings (e.g., delighted, hostile,
joyful, scared), and rated how much the different emotions motivate them to achieve their
goals, and how much the different emotions make it easier for them to do things to
achieve their goals on a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly
agree). The analytic strategy for the PAUse-r is similar to that for the AVI; however,
because there are two items on the PAUse-r, eight descriptor words were averaged to
measure instrumental motives for each emotion instead of four descriptor words. Across
both items, eight of the 24 descriptor words were averaged to measure instrumental
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motives for anger (i.e., hostile, angry, irritated, mad), eight were averaged to measure
instrumental motives for fear (i.e., scared, fearful, afraid, nervous), and eight were
averaged to measure instrumental motives for joy (i.e., delighted, joyful, happy,
cheerful). The PAUse-r has demonstrated good construct and discriminant validity
(Chow et al., 2017). In this sample, the PAUse-r demonstrated excellent internal
reliability for the anger (α = .92), fear (α = .93), and joy (α = .94) subscales. See

Appendix D for the full measure.
Attitudes Toward Emotions Questionnaire
To measure hedonistic motives, I used the Attitudes Toward Emotions
Questionnaire (ATE; Harmon-Jones et al., 2011), which is a self-report measure of an
emotion’s subjective feel on a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = Rarely/never, 5 = Almost
always/always). The ATE contains 28 items (e.g., “I like the feeling of power I get from
expressing my anger”) that produce five subscale scores for five discrete emotions (i.e.,
anger, joy, sadness, disgust, fear); however, due to the specific aims of this study, only
the three relevant subscales (i.e., Attitudes Toward Anger, Attitudes Toward Joy,
Attitudes Toward Fear) were given. The ATE has repeatedly demonstrated good
predictive validity (Harmon-Jones et al., 2011). In this sample, none of the ATE
subscales demonstrated acceptable reliability; however, the ATE-Anger (α = .67) and
ATE-Fear (α = .69) subscales approached acceptable internal reliability, whereas the
ATE-Joy (α = .54) subscale demonstrated poor internal reliability. Reliability analyses
indicated that removing a single item from each of the ATE subscales improved internal
reliability for each subscale. Removing the item “I dislike how it feels when I’m angry”
from the ATE-Anger subscale resulted in acceptable internal reliability (α = .73).
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Removing the item “I do things just because they scare me” from the ATE-Fear subscale
resulted in acceptable internal reliability (α = .79). Removing the item “I like
experiencing joy” resulted in acceptable internal reliability (α = .77). Thus, the reduced
versions of each subscale were used in analyses. See Appendix D for the full measure.
Demographics
For demographics, I measured biological sex, gender identity, race/ethnicity, age,

highest level of education, annual household income, and perceived social status. To
measure perceived social status, I used the MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status
(MacArthur SSS Scale; Adler et al., 2000), which is a single-item measure that presents
participants with a drawing of a ladder that represents where people stand in society (i.e.,
people on the top rung are better off, people on the bottom rung are worse off), and asks
participants to indicate on which rung they stand, and thus where they believe they stand
in society. I chose to measure perceived social status in addition to highest level of
education and annual household income in order to exploratorily address differences in
objective and subjective socioeconomic status, given that people with elevated levels of
psychopathy tend to hold grandiose perceptions of themselves. See Appendix E for the
full measure.
Design
This study employed a correlational design to explore mediational mechanisms
that possibly explain associations between psychopathic traits and emotion dysregulation.
I conducted mediation analyses to analyze the indirect effects of hedonistic motives,
instrumental motives, and emotion goals on the relation between psychopathic traits and
emotion dysregulation.

34
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Zero-Order Correlations. Psychopathy total scores and emotion
dysregulation will be positively associated. Psychopathy will also be positively
associated with the perceived pleasantness of anger and fear, the perceived utility of
anger and fear, and general emotion goals for anger and fear. In addition, psychopathy
will be negatively associated with the perceived pleasantness of joy, the perceived utility
of joy, and general emotion goals for joy.
Hypothesis 2: Serial Mediation Models – Hedonistic Motives. The relation
between psychopathy and emotion goals for anger, fear, and joy will be mediated by the
perceived pleasantness of anger, fear, and joy. In addition, the relation between
psychopathy and emotion dysregulation will be serially mediated by the perceived
pleasantness of anger, fear, and joy, as well as general emotion goals for anger, fear, and
joy.
Hypothesis 3: Serial Mediation Models – Instrumental Motives. The relation
between psychopathy and emotion goals for anger, fear, and joy will be mediated by the
perceived utility of anger, fear, and joy. Further, the relation between psychopathy and
emotion dysregulation will be serially mediated by the perceived utility of anger, fear,
and joy, as well as general emotion goals for anger, fear, and joy.
Data Handling
A Priori Power Analysis & Data Output Issues
Because G*Power (Faul et al., 2009), a program widely used in psychological
research to conduct power analyses, is not capable of calculating sample size for
mediational analyses, I used an alternative method of determining sample size posited by
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Fritz and MacKinnon (2007). Fritz and MacKinnon (2007) created a table for
determining sample size based on three criteria: 1) the estimated effect size for the a path;
2) the estimated effect size for the b path; and 3) the type of mediational test used.
According to Fritz and MacKinnon’s (2007) power table for meditational analyses, when
using percentile bootstrapping, the sample size needed to detect a small effect for the a
path and a small effect for the b path is 558. These effect sizes were estimated using

results reported by Spantidaki Kyriazi et al. (2021). Thus, ideally, I would have recruited
600 participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), and offer $1.00 as
compensation.
Because the funding offered by the University of Northern Iowa’s Intercollegiate
Academics Fund (IAF) was not enough to cover recruiting 600 participants, I used
CloudResearch’s MTurk Toolkit to specify the recruitment of 562 male participants. The
CloudResearch MTurk Toolkit offers researchers the opportunity to recruit participants
from MTurk and specify pre-exclusionary criteria, including those that may improve data
quality over using MTurk alone. Despite specifying the recruitment of 562 male
participants in CloudResearch, there were 878 observations in the Qualtrics output file.
These additional observations were the result of participants taking the survey through
MTurk, but not submitting a completion code when prompted, and thus these
observations were categorized as “not submitted” by MTurk and CloudResearch, and
these participants were not initially compensated for their participation. Although their
data was not identifiable in the Qualtrics output, I was able to identify the MTurk worker
ID associated with most of these participants through collaboration with CloudResearch.
Furthermore, the participants that were matched to MTurk worker IDs were compensated
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through MTurk with research funds held by the chair of this project, Dr. Nicholas
Schwab.
Data Cleaning Protocol
Pre-exclusionary criteria entered into the CloudResearch MTurk Toolkit included
excluding participants assigned female sex at birth, participants not residing in the U.S.,
participants younger than 18 years of age, and participants with duplicate or suspicious

geocodes. Of the 878 participants that completed the Qualtrics survey, 17 reported their
sex assigned at birth as female, and one did not identify a sex assigned at birth. Thus,
these 18 cases were excluded from all further analyses. In addition, there were no
participants that did not reside in the U.S., no participants that were younger than 18
years of age, and no participants that expressed duplicate or suspicious geocodes.
Post-exclusionary criteria applied included having duplicate or suspicious IP
addresses, having careless data, having dishonest data, or having missing values. Fiftytwo cases were excluded for demonstrating duplicate IP addresses. Additionally, I
deemed participants’ data as careless if they missed all three of the attention checks (see
Appendix H), which were presented at different points throughout the survey in Likerttype format; or, if the duration of their survey was two standard deviations below the
mean of sample participants’ total survey duration. Twenty-four participants were
excluded for missing all three attention checks, and no participants were excluded for
having a survey duration of less than the sample’s mean survey duration. I also deemed
participants’ data as careless if they missed two of the three attention checks in
conjunction with a survey duration two standard deviations below the mean. There were
no participants whose survey duration was two standard deviations below the mean
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duration, and therefore no participants were excluded based on this criterion. Further, I
deemed participants’ data as dishonest if they indicated a lack of honesty in responding.
There were no participants who indicated that they were dishonest in their responding,
and therefore no participants were excluded based on this criterion. Lastly, two exclusion
criteria were applied in regard to missing values. First, if a participant completed less
than 50% of an instrument that has good reliability (α = .80) or less than 100% of an

instrument with poor reliability (α < .80), I excluded their data from analyses for that
instrument. Based on these criteria, no participants were excluded from analyses with the
SRP-SF, DERS-16, AVI subscales, or PAUse-r subscales. However, for the ATE
subscales, seven participants were excluded from analyses with the Anger subscale, eight
were excluded from analyses with the Joy subscale, and 10 were excluded from analyses
with the Fear subscale. Lastly, if a participant completed less than 50% of the entire
survey, I excluded their data entirely from analysis. No participants were excluded from
analyses based on this criterion.
Because I used PROCESS (Hayes, 2012) for the mediation analyses, the influence
of outliers was not a concern. PROCESS is a robust test of mediational relations that does
not assume normality of data nor linearity of the model, and achieves this by generating a
sample distribution using a bootstrapping procedure. Therefore, extreme responses and
skewed distributions would not influence the analyses and was not a concern.
Data Analytic Protocol
First, I calculated descriptive statistics and zero-order, bootstrapped correlations
for all study variables (i.e., psychopathy total scores, psychopathy facet scores, hedonistic
motives, instrumental motives, emotion goals, emotion dysregulation). Next, I conducted
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mediation analyses for the serial mediation models proposed. Specifically, I treated the
psychopathy total score as the predictor variable and emotion dysregulation as the
outcome variable, with hedonistic motives, instrumental motives, and emotion goals as
mediators (see Figure 1). In total, there were six separate mediation models (see Figures 2
through 7, which depict each hypothesized model); the first three models examined
hedonistic motives and corresponding emotion goals as mediators, whereas the second
three models examined instrumental motives and corresponding emotion goals as
mediators. The reason for having three models for each motive-type is due to the three
different emotions being examined (i.e., anger, fear, joy). For instance, hedonistic
motives for anger and emotion goals for anger would serially mediate the relationship
between psychopathy and emotion dysregulation. Next, I examined the indirect effects of
psychopathic traits on emotion dysregulation via hedonistic motives, instrumental
motives, and emotion goals for anger, fear, and joy. All analyses were initially conducted
using the full ATE subscales, and then repeated using the reduced version each subscale.
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Figure 1
Hypothesized Mediation Model with Motives and Emotion Goals as Mediators

40
Figure 2
Hedonistic Motives and Emotion Goals for Anger as Mediators
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Figure 3
Instrumental Motives and Emotion Goals for Anger as Mediators
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Figure 4
Hedonistic Motives and Emotion Goals for Fear as Mediators

Figure 5
Instrumental Motives and Emotion Goals for Fear as Mediators
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Figure 6
Hedonistic Motives and Emotion Goals for Joy as Mediators

Figure 7
Instrumental Motives and Emotion Goals for Joy as Mediators
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Chapter 3: Results
Descriptive and Inferential Statistics
Descriptive statistics for all study variables are included in Table 2, and
descriptive statistics for all study variables using the full ATE subscales are reported in
Table 3. The mean of SRP-SF total scores in this sample indicate that most participants
scored on the lower end of the psychopathy continuum (M = 54.21, SD = 18.61), as the
maximum score achievable is 135. This is not surprising, given that an overwhelming
majority of people in the general population do not present with high levels of
psychopathic traits (Neumann et al., 2015). The mean of DERS-16 scores indicate that
most participants in this sample scored on the lower end of the emotion dysregulation
spectrum (M = 31.56, SD = 13.12), as the maximum score achievable is 80. The mean
AVI-Anger score in this sample indicates that most participants scored on the lower end
of the spectrum for having emotion goals for experiencing anger (M = 1.34, SD = .57), as
the maximum score achievable is 10. The mean of AVI-Fear scores in this sample
indicates that most participants scored on the lower end of the spectrum for having
emotion goals for experiencing fear (M = 1.37, SD = .59), as the maximum score
achievable is 10. The mean of AVI-Joy scores in this sample indicates that most
participants scored in the low to middle range of the spectrum for having emotion goals
for experiencing joy, (M = 4.08, SD = .86), as the maximum score achievable is 10. The
mean of ATE-Anger scores in this sample indicates that most participants scored on the
lower end of the spectrum for enjoying experiences for anger (M = 5.62, SD = 2.33), as
the maximum score achievable is 25.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for All Study Variables
Variable

n
686
686

M
54.21
31.56

SD
18.61
13.12

Range*
14-145
8-80

Anger
Fear
Joy

686
686
686

1.34
1.37
4.08

.57
.59
.86

0.5-5
0.5-5
0.5-5

Anger
Fear

686
686

5.62
9.76

2.33
4.05

0.5-6.25
0.5-5

Joy
PAUse-r
Anger

686

17.68

2.76

0.5-5

686

1.92

.91

0.5-5

SRP-SF
DERS-16
AVI

ATE

Fear
686
2.04
.98
0.5-5
Joy
686
4.09
.80
0.5-5
Note. SRP-SF = Self-Report Psychopathy Scale-Short Form; DERS-16 = Difficulties in
Emotion Regulation Scale-16; AVI = Affect Valuation Index; ATE = Attitudes Toward
Emotions; PAUse-r = Perceived Affect Utility Scale-Revised; n = number of
observations included in correlation analyses; M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation;
Range* = Range of Possible Scores.

Hypothesis 1: Bootstrapped Zero-Order Correlations
Psychopathy
In support of my hypothesis, scores on the SRP-SF were positively and
moderately correlated with DERS-16 scores, r = .42, p < .01, 95% CI [.35, .48], AVIAnger scores, r = .37, p < .01, 95% CI [.31, .44], AVI-Fear scores, r = .32, p < .01, 95%
CI [.25, .39], PAUse-r Anger scores, r = .43, p < .01, 95% CI [.36, .48], and PAUse-r
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Fear scores, r = .30, p < .01, 95% CI [.23, .36].Also in support of my hypothesis, SRP-SF
scores were positively and strongly correlated with ATE-Anger scores, r = .60, p < .01,
95% CI [.55, .65], and ATE-Fear scores, r = .49, p < .01, 95% CI [.43, .55].

Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for All Study Variables Using Full ATE Subscales.
Variable

n
751
765

M
54.21
31.55

SD
18.63
13.14

Range*
14-145
8-80

SRP-SF
DERS-16
AVI
Anger
780
1.34
.57
0.5-5
Fear
779
1.37
.59
0.5-5
Joy
768
4.08
.86
0.5-5
ATE
Anger
779
7.81
2.97
2-25
Fear
777
14.19
4.00
2-30
Joy
778
19.26
2.59
2-25
PAUse-r
Anger
773
1.92
.91
0.5-5
Fear
777
2.04
.98
0.5-5
Joy
767
4.09
.80
0.5-5
Note. SRP-SF = Self-Report Psychopathy Scale-Short Form; DERS-16 = Difficulties in
Emotion Regulation Scale-16; AVI = Affect Valuation Index; ATE = Attitudes Toward
Emotions; PAUse-r = Perceived Affect Utility Scale-Revised; n = number of
observations included in correlation analyses; M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation;
Range* = Range of Possible Scores.

In addition, SRP-SF scores were negatively correlated with ATE-Joy scores, r = -.15, p <
.01, 95% CI [-.22, -.07], and PAUse-r Joy scores, r = -.17, p < .01, 95% CI [-.24, -.09], as
expected. Although the correlation between SRP-SF and AVI-Joy scores was
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nonsignificant, r = -.07, p = .058, 95% CI [-.15, .00], the relation was trending in the
hypothesized direction. Thus, greater levels of psychopathic traits were associated not
only with greater levels of emotion dysregulation, having more emotion goals for anger
and fear, having a greater perceived utility of anger and fear, and having a greater
perceived pleasantness of anger and fear, but also having a lower perceived pleasantness
of joy and a lower perceived utility of joy. Correlation coefficients for all study variables
are included in Table 4, and correlation coefficients for all study variables using the full
ATE subscales are reported in Table 5.
Emotion Dysregulation
Scores on the DERS-16 were positively correlated with SRP-SF scores, r = .42, p < .01,
95% CI [.35, .48], AVI-Anger scores, r = .32, p < .01, 95% CI [.25, .38], AVI-Fear
scores, r = .33, p < .01, 95% CI [.26, .40], ATE-Anger scores, r = .32, p < .01, 95% CI
[.25, .38], ATE-Fear scores, r = .17, p < .01, 95% CI [.10, .25], PAUse-r Anger scores, r
= .21, p < .01, 95% CI [.14, .28], and PAUse-r Fear scores, r = .22, p < .01, 95% CI [.15,
.29]. In addition, DERS-16 scores were negatively correlated with ATE-Joy scores, r = .10, p < .01, 95% CI [-.18, -.03]. The relations between DERS-16 scores and AVI-Joy
scores, r = -.06, p = .153, 95% CI [-.13, .02], and DERS-16 scores and PAUse-r Joy
scores, r = -.08, p < .05, 95% CI [-.14, .01], were nonsignificant, although they were
trending in the hypothesized direction. These results indicate that greater levels of
emotion dysregulation were associated not only with greater levels of psychopathy,
having more emotion goals for anger and fear, having a greater perceived pleasantness
and perceived utility of anger and fear, but also having a lower perceived pleasantness of
joy.

Correlations for All Study Variables

Table 4
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Bootstrapped Correlations for All Study Variables Using Full ATE Subscales

Table 5
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Emotion Goals
Anger. Scores on the AVI-Anger subscale were positively correlated with SRPSF scores, r = .37, p < .01, 95% CI [.31, .44], DERS-16 scores, r = .32, p < .01, 95% CI
[.25, .38], AVI-Fear scores, r = .75, p < .01, 95% CI [.71, .78], ATE-Anger scores, r =
.44, p < .01, 95% CI [.38, .50], ATE-Fear scores, r = .25, p < .01, 95% CI [.18, .32],
PAUse-r Anger scores, r = .34, p < .01, 95% CI [.27, .41], and PAUse-r Fear scores, r =

.24, p < .01, 95% CI [.17, .31]. In addition, AVI-Anger scores were negatively correlated
with AVI-Joy scores, r = -.46, p < .01, 95% CI [-.51, -.39], ATE-Joy scores, r = -.29, p <
.01, 95% CI [-.36, -.22], and PAUse-r Joy scores, r = -.17, p < .01, 95% CI [-.24, -.10].
These results indicate that having more emotion goals for anger was associated not only
with having greater levels of psychopathy, having greater levels of emotion
dysregulation, having more emotion goals for fear, and having a greater perceived
pleasantness and perceived utility of anger and fear, but also having less emotion goals
for joy and a lower perceived pleasantness and perceived utility of joy.
Fear. AVI-Fear subscale scores were positively correlated with SRP-SF scores, r
= .32, p < .01, 95% CI [.25, .39], DERS-16 scores, r = .33, p < .01, 95% CI [.26, .40],
AVI-Anger scores, r = .75, p < .01, 95% CI [.71, .78], ATE-Anger scores, r = .36, p <
.01, 95% CI [.29, .42], ATE-Fear scores, r = .25, p < .01, 95% CI [.18, .32], PAUse-r
Anger scores, r = .26, p < .01, 95% CI [.19, .33], and PAUse-r Fear scores, r = .34, p <
.01, 95% CI [.27, .40]. Additionally, AVI-Fear scores were negatively correlated with
AVI-Joy scores, r = -.40, p < .01, 95% CI [-.46, -.34], ATE-Joy scores, r = -.25, p < .01,
95% CI [-.31, -.17], and PAUse-r Joy scores, r = -.17, p < .01, 95% CI [-.24, -.10]. These
results indicate that having more emotion goals for fear was associated not only with
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having greater levels of psychopathy, greater levels of emotion dysregulation, more
emotion goals for anger, and a greater perceived pleasantness and perceived utility of
anger and fear, but also having less emotion goals for joy and a lower perceived
pleasantness and perceived utility of joy.
Joy. AVI-Joy subscale scores were negatively correlated with AVI-Anger scores,
r = -.46, p < .01, 95% CI [-.51, -.39], AVI-Fear scores, r = -.40, p < .01, 95% CI [-.46, -

.34], ATE-Anger scores, r = -.19, p < .01, 95% CI [-.26, -.12], and PAUse-r Anger
scores, r = -.13, p < .01, 95% CI [-.20, -.05]. In addition, AVI-Joy subscale scores were
positively correlated with ATE-Joy scores, r = .41, p < .01, 95% CI [.34, .47], and
PAUse-r Joy scores, r = .37, p < .01, 95% CI [.30, .43]. The relations between AVI-Joy
scores and SRP-SF scores, r = -.07, p = .058, 95% CI [-.15, .00], AVI-Joy scores and
DERS-16 scores, r = -.06, p = .153, 95% CI [-.13, .02], AVI-Joy scores and ATE-Fear
scores, r = -.01, p = .709, 95% CI [-.06, .09], and AVI-Joy scores and PAUse-r Fear
scores, r = -.07, p = .084, 95% CI [-.14, .01], were nonsignificant, although these
correlations were trending in the anticipated direction. These results suggest that having
more emotion goals for joy was associated not only with less emotion goals for anger and
fear and a lower perceived pleasantness and perceived utility of anger, but also greater
perceived pleasantness and perceived utility of joy.
Hedonistic Motives
Anger. Scores on the ATE-Anger subscale were positively correlated with SRPSF scores, r = .60, p < .01, 95% CI [.55, .65], DERS-16 scores, r = .32, p < .01, 95% CI
[.25, .38], AVI-Anger scores, r = .44, p < .01, 95% CI [.38, .50], AVI-Fear scores, r =
.36, p < .01, 95% CI [.29, .42], ATE-Fear scores, r = .57, p < .01, 95% CI [.52, .62],
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PAUse-r Anger scores, r = .41, p < .01, 95% CI [.34, .47], and PAUse-r Fear scores, r =
.19, p < .01, 95% CI [.12, .27]. In addition, ATE-Anger subscale scores were negatively
correlated with AVI-Joy scores, r = -.19, p < .01, 95% CI [-.26, -.12], ATE-Joy scores, r
= -.28, p < .01, 95% CI [.34, .21], and PAUse-r Joy scores, r = -.21, p < .01, 95% CI [.28, -.14]. These results suggest that perceiving anger as a more pleasant emotion was
associated not only with having greater levels of psychopathy, greater levels of emotion

dysregulation, more emotion goals for anger and fear, perceiving fear as a pleasant and
useful emotion, and perceiving anger as a useful emotion, but also having less emotion
goals for joy, and perceiving joy as an unpleasant and less useful emotion.
Fear. ATE-Fear subscale scores were positively correlated with SRP-SF scores, r
= .49, p < .01, 95% CI [.43, .55], DERS-16 scores, r = .17, p < .01, 95% CI [.10, .25],
AVI-Anger scores, r = .27, p < .01, AVI-Fear scores, r = .25, p < .01, 95% CI [.18, .32],
ATE-Anger scores, r = .57, p < .01, 95% CI [.52, .62], PAUse-r Anger scores, r = .29, p
< .01, 95% CI [.22, .36], and PAUse-r Fear scores, r = .19, p < .01, 95% CI [.11, .26].
The correlations between ATE-Fear scores and AVI-Joy scores, r = -.01, p = .709, 95%
CI [-.06, .09], ATE-Fear scores and ATE-Joy scores, r = -.02, p = .669, 95% CI [-.09,
.06], as well as ATE-Fear scores and PAUse-r Joy scores, r = -.03, p = .426, 95% CI [.11, .05], were nonsignificant, although they were trending in the anticipated direction.
These results suggest that perceiving fear as a pleasant emotion is associated with greater
levels of psychopathy, greater levels of emotion dysregulation, having more emotion
goals for anger and fear, perceiving anger as a pleasant and useful emotion, and
perceiving fear as a useful emotion.
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Joy. ATE-Joy subscale scores were negatively correlated with SRP-SF scores, r =
-.15, p < .01, 95% CI [-.22, -.07], DERS-16 scores, r = -.10, p < .01, 95% CI [-.18, -.03],
AVI-Anger scores, r = -.29, p < .01, 95% CI [-.36, -.22], AVI-Fear scores, r = -.25, p <
.01, 95% CI [-.31, -.17], ATE-Anger scores, r = -.28, p < .01, 95% CI [.34, .21], and
PAUse-r Anger scores, r = -.11, p < .01, 95% CI [-.19, -.04]. Additionally, ATE-Joy
scores were positively correlated with PAUse-r Joy scores, r = .36, p < .01, 95% CI [.29,

.42]. The correlations between ATE-Joy scores and ATE-Fear scores, r = -.02, p = .669,
95% CI [-.09, .06], and ATE-Joy scores and PAUse-r Fear scores, r = -.05, p = .182, 95%
CI [-.13, .02], were nonsignificant, although the correlation was trending in the expected
direction. These results indicate that perceiving joy as a pleasant emotion was associated
not only with lower levels of psychopathy, lower levels of emotion dysregulation, having
less emotion goals for anger and fear, and perceiving anger as a pleasant and useful
emotion, but also perceiving joy as a useful emotion.
Instrumental Motives
Anger. Scores on the PAUse-r Anger subscale were positively correlated with
SRP-SF scores, r = .43, p < .01, 95% CI [.36, .48], DERS-16 scores, r = .21, p < .01, 95%
CI [.14, .28], AVI-Anger scores, r = .34, p < .01, 95% CI [.27, .41], AVI-Fear scores, r =
.26, p < .01, 95% CI [.19, .33], ATE-Anger scores, r = .41, p < .01, 95% CI [.34, .47],
ATE-Fear scores, r = .29, p < .01, 95% CI [.22, .36], and PAUse-r Fear scores, r = .57, p
< .01, 95% CI [.51, .61]. In addition, PAUse-r Anger scores were negatively correlated
with AVI-Joy scores, r = -.13, p < .01, 95% CI [-.20, -.05], ATE-Joy scores, r = -.11, p <
.01, 95% CI [-.19, -.04], and PAUse-r Joy scores, r = -.33, p < .01, 95% CI [-.40, -.26].
These results indicate that perceiving anger as a useful emotion is associated not only
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with greater levels of psychopathy, greater levels of emotion dysregulation, having
emotion goals for anger and fear, perceiving anger as a pleasant emotion, and perceiving
fear as a pleasant and useful emotion, but also having less emotion goals for joy and
perceiving joy as an unpleasant and less useful emotion.
Fear. PAUse-r Fear scores were positively correlated with SRP-SF scores, r =
.30, p < .01, 95% CI [.23, .36], DERS-16 scores, r = .22, p < .01, 95% CI [.15, .29], AVI-

Anger scores, r = .24, p < .01, 95% CI [.17, .31], AVI-Fear scores, r = .34, p < .01, 95%
CI [.27, .40], ATE-Anger scores, r = .19, p < .01, 95% CI [.12, .27], ATE-Fear scores, r =
.19, p < .01, 95% CI [.11, .26], and PAUse-r Anger scores, r = .57, p < .01, 95% CI [.51,
.61]. In addition, PAUse-r Fear scores were negatively correlated with AVI-Joy scores, r
= -.07, p < .01, 95% CI [-.14, .01], and PAUse-r Joy scores, r = -.33, p < .01, 95% CI [.39, -.26]. The relation between PAUse-r Fear scores and ATE-Joy scores, r = -.05, p =
.182, 95% CI [-.13, .02], was nonsignificant but trending in the anticipated direction.
These results suggest that perceiving fear as a useful emotion is associated not only with
greater levels of psychopathy, greater emotion dysregulation, having emotion goals for
anger and fear, perceiving anger as a pleasant and useful emotion, and perceiving fear as
a pleasant emotion, but also with having less emotion goals for joy, and perceiving joy as
a less useful emotion.
Joy. PAUse-r Joy scores were negatively correlated with SRP-SF scores, r = -.17,
p < .01, 95% CI [-.24, -.09], DERS-16 scores, r = -.08, p < .05, 95% CI [-.14, .01], AVIAnger scores, r = -.17, p < .01, 95% CI [-.24, -.10], AVI-Fear scores, r = -.17, p < .01,
95% CI [-.24, -.10], ATE-Anger scores, r = -.21, p < .01, 95% CI [-.28, -.14], PAUse-r
Anger scores, r = -.33, p < .01, 95% CI [-.40, -.26], and PAUse-r Fear scores, r = -.33, p
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< .01, 95% CI [-.39, -.26]. Additionally, PAUse-r Joy scores were positively correlated
with AVI-Joy scores, r = .37, p < .01, 95% CI [.30, .43], and ATE-Joy scores, r = .36, p <
.01, 95% CI [.29, .42]. The correlation between PAUse-r Joy scores and ATE-Fear
scores, r = -.03, p = .426, 95% CI [-.11, .05], was nonsignificant but trending in the
anticipated direction. These results suggest that perceiving joy as a useful emotion is
associated not only with lower levels of psychopathy, lower levels of emotion
dysregulation, having no emotion goals for anger and fear, perceiving anger as a less
pleasant and less useful emotion, and perceiving fear as a less useful emotion.
Hypothesis 2: Serial Mediation Models – Hedonistic Motives
Serial Mediation Model 1: Anger
All serial mediation analyses were conducted using PROCESS version 4.0 for
SPSS with 5,000 bootstrapped samples. Because each of the hypothesized serial
mediation models involve two mediators in a specified path, the Model 6 template was
chosen. In this hypothesized model, psychopathy (as measured by the SRP-SF) is the
predictor variable, emotion dysregulation (as measured by the DERS-16) is the outcome
variable, hedonistic motives for anger (as measured by ATE-Anger) is the first mediator,
and emotion goals for anger (as measured by AVI-Anger) is the second mediator.
Results from serial mediation analyses indicate that the overall model (from SRPSF to ATE-Anger to AVI-Anger to DERS-16) is significant, F(3, 727) = 69.71, p < .001.
Specifically, ATE-Anger and AVI-Anger serially mediate the relation between SRP-SF
and DERS-16, and together account for 22% of the variance in DERS-16 scores. In
addition, the direct effect of SRP-SF on DERS-16, through ATE-Anger and AVI-Anger,
was significant, b = .26, t(727) = 7.8, p < .001. Regarding direct path analyses, SRP-SF
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significantly predicted ATE-Anger (path α1), b = .64, t(729) = 22.5, p < .001, AVI-Anger
(path α2), b = .13, t(728) = 3.12, p < .001, and DERS-16 (path c), b = .42, t(729) = 12.5, p
< .001. ATE-Anger significantly predicted AVI-Anger (path d21), b = .37, t(728) = 8.7, p
< .001, and both ATE-Anger, (path β1), b = .18, t(727) = 4.0, p < .001, and AVI-Anger
(path β2), b = .14, t(727) = 3.7, p < .001, significantly predicted DERS-16. Results from
direct path analyses are modeled in Figure 8, and results from direct path analyses using

the full ATE subscale are modeled in Figure 9.

Figure 8
Standardized Regression Coefficients for Model 1
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Figure 9
Standardized Regression Coefficients for Model 1 Using Full ATE-Anger Scale

Results from analyses of indirect effects (IE) for all six models are located in
Table 6, and results from analyses of IEs for all six models using the full ATE subscales
are located in Table 7. These results indicate that the path from SRP-SF to ATE-Anger to
DERS-16 was significant, IE = .11, SE = .04, p < .001, 95% CI [.04, .19], which means
that the perceived pleasantness of anger independently mediated the relation between
psychopathy and emotion dysregulation. In addition, the path from SRP-SF to AVIAnger to DERS-16 was significant, IE = .02, SE = .009, p < .001, 95% CI [.004, .04],

which means that emotion goals for anger also independently mediated the relation
between psychopathy and emotion dysregulation. Lastly, the path from SRP-SF to ATEAnger to AVI-Anger to DERS-16 was also significant, IE = .03, SE = .01, p < .001, 95%
CI [.01, .06], which means that the perceived pleasantness of anger mediated the relation
between psychopathy and emotion goals for anger, and emotion goals for anger mediated
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the relation between perceived pleasantness of anger and emotion dysregulation. Table 6
includes standardized indirect effects for all six models, and Table 7 includes
standardized indirect effects for all six models using the full ATE subscales.
Serial Mediation Model 2: Fear
In this hypothesized model, psychopathy (as measured by the SRP-SF) is the
predictor variable, emotion dysregulation (as measured by the DERS-16) is the outcome

variable, hedonistic motives for fear (as measured by ATE-Fear) is the first mediator, and
emotion goals for fear (as measured by AVI-Fear) is the second mediator. Results from
serial mediation analyses with 5,000 bootstrapped samples indicate that the overall model
(from SRP-SF to ATE-Fear to AVI-Fear to DERS-16) is significant, F(3, 727) = 71.12, p
< .001. Specifically, ATE-Fear and AVI-Fear serially mediate the relation between SRPSF and DERS-16, and together account for 23% of the variance in DERS-16 scores.
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Table 6
Standardized Indirect Effects for All Mediation Models
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Table 7
Standardized Indirect Effects for All Medication Models Using Full ATE Subscales

In addition, the direct effect of SRP-SF on DERS-16, through ATE-Fear and AVI-Fear,
was significant, b = .38, t(3, 727) = 9.8, p < .001.Regarding direct path analyses, SRP-SF
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significantly predicted ATE-Fear (path α1), b = .53, t(729) = 16.7, p < .001, AVI-Fear
(path α2), b = .24, t(728) = 5.82, p < .001, and DERS-16 (path c), b = .42, t(1, 729) =
12.5, p < .001. ATE-Fear significantly predicted AVI-Fear (path d21), b = .14, t(728) =
3.5, p < .001, but not DERS-16 (path β1), b = -.07, t(3, 727) = -1.91, p = .057, whereas
AVI-Fear did significantly predict DERS-16 (path β2), b = .24, t(3, 727) = 6.84, p < .001.
Results from direct path analyses are modeled in Figure 10, and results from direct path

analyses using the full ATE subscale are modeled in Figure 11.

Figure 10
Standardized Regression Coefficients for Model 2
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Figure 11
Standardized Regression Coefficients for Model 2 Using Full ATE-Fear Scale

Analyses of indirect effects (IE) indicate that the path from SRP-SF to ATE-Fear
to DERS-16 was not significant, IE = -.04, SE = .02, p < .001, 95% CI [-.08, .002], which
means that the perceived pleasantness of fear did not independently mediate the relation
between psychopathy and emotion dysregulation. However, the path from SRP-SF to
AVI-Fear to DERS-16 was significant, IE = .06, SE = .02, p < .001, 95% CI [.03, .09],
which means that emotion goals for fear do independently mediate the relation between
psychopathy and emotion dysregulation. In addition, the path from SRP-SF to ATE-Fear
to AVI-Fear to DERS-16 was significant, IE = .02, SE = .006, p < .001, 95% CI [.008,
.03], which means that the perceived pleasantness of fear mediated the relation between
psychopathy and emotion goals for fear, and emotion goals for fear mediated the relation
between perceived pleasantness of fear and emotion dysregulation.
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Serial Mediation Model 3: Joy
In this hypothesized model, psychopathy (as measured by the SRP-SF) is the
predictor variable, emotion dysregulation (as measured by the DERS-16) is the outcome
variable, hedonistic motives for joy (as measured by ATE-Joy) is the first mediator, and
emotion goals for joy (as measured by AVI-Joy) is the second mediator.
Results from serial mediation analyses with 5,000 bootstrapped samples indicate

that the overall model (from SRP-SF to ATE-Joy to AVI-Joy to DERS-16) is significant,
F(1, 719) = 55.96, p < .001. Specifically, ATE-Joy and AVI-Joy mediate the relation
between SRP-SF and DERS-16, and together account for 19% of the variance in DERS16 scores. In addition, the direct effect of SRP-SF on DERS-16, through ATE-Joy and
AVI-Joy, was significant, b = .39, t(3, 719) = 11.04, p < .001. Regarding direct path
analyses, SRP-SF negatively predicted ATE-Joy (path α1), b = -.30, t(721) = -8.5, p <
.001, and positively predicted DERS-16 (path c), b = .42, t(1, 721) = 12.53, p < .001, but
did not predict AVI-Joy (path α2) b = .06, t(720) = 1.67, p = .094. However, ATE-Joy
significantly predicted AVI-Joy (path d21), b = .44, t(720) = 12.6, p < .001, and
negatively predicted DERS-16 (path β1), b = -.12, t(3, 719) = -2.96, p < .005, whereas
AVI-Joy did not significantly predict DERS-16 (path β2), b = -.02, t(3, 719) = .54, p =
.587. Results from direct path analyses are depicted in Figure 12, and results from direct
path analyses using the full ATE subscale is depicted in Figure 13.
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Figure 12
Standardized Regression Coefficients for Model 3

Figure 13
Standardized Regression Coefficients for Model 3 Using Full ATE-Joy Scale
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Analyses of indirect effects (IE) indicate that the path from SRP-SF to ATE-Joy
to DERS-16 was significant, IE = .03, SE = .01, p < .001, 95% CI [.009, .06], which
means that the perceived pleasantness of joy independently mediated the relation between
psychopathy and emotion dysregulation. However, the path from SRP-SF to AVI-Joy to
DERS-16 was not significant, IE = .001, SE = .003, p < .001, 95% CI [-.004, .008], which
means that emotion goals for joy did not independently mediate the relation between
psychopathy and emotion dysregulation. In addition, the path from SRP-SF to ATE-Joy
to AVI-Joy to DERS-16 was also not significant, IE = -.003, SE = .006 p < .001, 95% CI
[-.014, .008], which means that the perceived pleasantness of joy did not mediate the
relation between psychopathy and emotion goals for joy, and emotion goals for joy did
not mediate the relation between perceived pleasantness of joy and emotion
dysregulation.
Hypothesis 3: Serial Mediation Models – Instrumental Motives
Serial Mediation Model 4: Anger
In this hypothesized model, psychopathy (as measured by the SRP-SF) is the
predictor variable, emotion dysregulation (as measured by the DERS-16) is the outcome
variable, instrumental motives for anger (as measured by PAUse-r Anger) is the first
mediator, and emotion goals for anger (as measured by AVI-Anger) is the second
mediator.
Results from serial mediation analyses with 5,000 bootstrapped samples indicate
that the overall model (from SRP-SF to PAUse-r Anger to AVI-Anger to DERS-16) is
significant, F(3, 736) = 61.71, p < .001. Specifically, PAUse-r Anger and AVI-Anger
serially mediate the relation between SRP-SF and DERS-16, and together account for

66
20% of the variance in DERS-16 scores. In addition, the direct effect of SRP-SF on
DERS-16, through PAUse-r Anger and AVI-Anger, was significant, b = .35, t(736) =
9.22, p < .001. Regarding direct path analyses, SRP-SF significantly predicted PAUse-r
Anger (path α1), b = .43, t(738) = 12.9, p < .001, AVI-Anger (path α2), b = .27, t(737) =
7.29, p < .001, and DERS-16 (path c), b = .41, t(738) = 12.38, p < .001. PAUse-r Anger
significantly predicted AVI-Anger (path d21), b = .24, t(737) = 6.37, p < .001, but not

DERS-16 (path β1), b = -.00, t(736) = -.10, p = .917, whereas AVI-Anger did
significantly predict DERS-16 (path β2), b = .18, t(736) = 5.06, p < .001. Results from
direct path analyses are depicted in Figure 14.

Figure 14
Standardized Regression Coefficients for Model 4

Analyses of indirect effects (IE) indicate that the path from SRP-SF to PAUse-r
Anger to DERS-16 was not significant, IE = -.002, SE = .02, p < .001, 95% CI [-.04, .03],
which means that the perceived utility of anger did not independently mediate the relation
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between psychopathy and emotion dysregulation. However, the path from SRP-SF to
AVI-Anger to DERS-16 was significant, IE = .05, SE = .01, p < .001, 95% CI [.02, .08],
which means that emotion goals for anger do independently mediate the relation between
psychopathy and emotion dysregulation. In addition, the path from SRP-SF to PAUse-r
Anger to AVI-Anger to DERS-16 was significant, IE = .02, SE = .01, p < .001, 95% CI
[.01, .03], which means that the perceived utility of anger mediated the relation between
psychopathy and emotion goals for anger, and emotion goals for anger mediated the
relation between perceived utility of anger and emotion dysregulation.
Serial Mediation Model 5: Fear
In this hypothesized model, psychopathy (as measured by the SRP-SF) is the
predictor variable, emotion dysregulation (as measured by the DERS-16) is the outcome
variable, instrumental motives for fear (as measured by PAUse-r Fear) is the first
mediator, and emotion goals for fear (as measured by AVI-Fear) is the second mediator.
Results from serial mediation analyses with 5,000 bootstrapped samples indicate that the
overall model (from SRP-SF to PAUse-r Fear to AVI-Fear to DERS-16) is significant,
F(3, 726) = 70.63, p < .001. Specifically, PAUse-r Fear and AVI-Fear serially mediate
the relation between SRP-SF and DERS-16, and together account for 22% of the variance
in DERS-16 scores. In addition, the direct effect of SRP-SF on DERS-16, through
PAUse-r Fear and AVI-Fear, was significant, b = .34, t(3, 725) = 9.6, p < .001.
Regarding direct path analyses, SRP-SF significantly predicted PAUse-r Fear
(path α1), b = .30, t(727) = 8.4, p < .001, AVI-Fear (path α2), b = .24, t(726) = 6.7, p <
.001, and DERS-16 (path c), b = .42, t(1, 727) = 12.5, p < .001. PAUse-r Fear
significantly predicted AVI-Fear (path d21), b = .16, t(726) = 7.54, p < .001, but not
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DERS-16 (path β1), b = .05, t(3, 725) = 1.33, p = .182, whereas AVI-Fear did
significantly predict DERS-16 (path β2), b = .21, t(3, 725) = 5.95, p < .001. Results from
direct path analyses are depicted in Figure 15.

Figure 15
Standardized Regression Coefficients for Model 5

Analyses of indirect effects (IE) indicate that the path from SRP-SF to PAUse-r
Fear to DERS-16 was not significant, IE = .01, SE = .01, p < .001, 95% CI [-.007, .04],
which means that the perceived utility of fear did not independently mediate the relation
between psychopathy and emotion dysregulation. However, the path from SRP-SF to
AVI-Fear to DERS-16 was significant, IE = .05, SE = .01, p < .001, 95% CI [.03, .08],
which means that emotion goals for fear do independently mediate the relation between
psychopathy and emotion dysregulation. In addition, the path from SRP-SF to PAUse-r
Fear to AVI-Fear to DERS-16 was significant, IE = .02, SE = .005, p < .001, 95% CI
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[.009, .03], which means that the perceived utility of fear mediated the relation between
psychopathy and emotion goals for fear, and emotion goals for fear mediated the relation
between perceived utility of fear and emotion dysregulation.
Serial Mediation Model 6: Joy
In this hypothesized model, psychopathy (as measured by the SRP-SF) is the
predictor variable, emotion dysregulation (as measured by the DERS-16) is the outcome

variable, instrumental motives for joy (as measured by PAUse-r Joy) is the first mediator,
and emotion goals for joy (as measured by AVI-Joy) is the second mediator.
Results from serial mediation analyses with 5,000 bootstrapped samples indicate
that the overall model (from SRP-SF to PAUse-r Joy to AVI-Joy to DERS-16) is
significant, F(3, 709) = 50.80, p < .001. Specifically, PAUse-r Joy and AVI-Joy mediate
the relation between SRP-SF and DERS-16, and together account for 18% of the variance
in DERS-16 scores. In addition, the direct effect of SRP-SF on DERS-16, through
PAUse-r Joy and AVI-Joy, was significant, b = .42, t(3, 709) = 12.14, p < .001.
Regarding direct path analyses, SRP-SF negatively predicted PAUse-r Joy (path α1), b = .16, t(711) = -4.3, p < .001, and positively predicted DERS-16 (path c), b = .42, t(1, 711)
= 12.32, p < .001, but did not significantly predict AVI-Joy (path α2), b = -.009, t(711) = .26, p = .792. PAUse-r Joy significantly predicted AVI-Joy (path d21), b = .36, t(711) =
10.16, p < .001, but neither PAUse-r Joy (path β1) b = .01, t(3, 709) = .30, p = .765, nor
AVI-Joy (path β2), b = -.03, t(3, 709) = -.94, p = .346, significantly predicted DERS-16.
Results from direct path analyses are depicted in Figure 16.
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Figure 16
Standardized Regression Coefficients for Model 6

Analyses of indirect effects (IE) indicate that the path from SRP-SF to PAUse-r
Joy to DERS-16 was not significant, IE = -.002, SE = .007, p < .001, 95% CI [-.015,
.012], which means that the perceived utility of joy did not independently mediate the
relation between psychopathy and emotion dysregulation. In addition, the path from SRPSF to AVI-Joy to DERS-16 was also not significant, IE = .0003, SE = .002, p < .001,
95% CI [-.003, .005], which means that emotion goals for joy do not independently
mediate the relation between psychopathy and emotion dysregulation. Furthermore, the
path from SRP-SF to PAUse-r Joy to AVI-Joy to DERS-16 was also not significant, IE =
.002, SE = .002, p < .001, 95% CI [-.002, .007], which means that the perceived utility of
joy did not mediate the relation between psychopathy and emotion goals for joy, and
emotion goals for joy did not mediate the relation between perceived utility of joy and
emotion dysregulation.
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Chapter 4: Discussion
The purpose of the current study was to examine the process by which males with
psychopathic traits experience emotion dysregulation. I found that people with greater
levels of psychopathic traits experience greater levels of emotion dysregulation, which is
consistent with both Hypothesis 1 and previous research by Garofalo et al. (2018, 2019,
2020). I also found that people with greater levels of psychopathic traits have more
hedonistic and instrumental motives for experiencing anger and fear, less hedonistic and
instrumental motives for experiencing joy, more general emotion goals for experiencing
anger and fear, and less general emotion goals for experiencing joy, which supports
Hypothesis 1. These results are consistent with those of Spantidaki Kyriazi et al. (2021),
which found that people with greater levels of psychopathic traits hold maladaptive
emotion goals, such as a greater desire for experiencing anger and fear in their daily lives.
Despite claims that people with psychopathic traits do not experience emotions, recent
research indicates that when people with psychopathic traits are attending to relevant
stimuli, they experience anger and anxiety or fear at rates similar to or greater than that of
control participants (Blackburn & Lee-Evans, 1985; Dawel et al., 2012; Derefinko, 2014;
Hare & Neumann, 2008; Hicks & Patrick, 2006; Kosson et al., 2016; Marsh, 2013; Marsh
& Blair, 2008; Marsh et al., 2011). From a motivational perspective, people with greater
levels of psychopathic traits may experience greater levels of anger and fear compared to
controls because they have a desire to experience greater levels of anger and fear. Not
only that, but having a general desire to experience anger and fear may motivate one to
regulate their experiences of anger and fear, such that when they experience these
emotions, they fixate on them and have no desire to redirect their attention elsewhere.
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In order to replicate and extend on previous findings and examine emotion
dysregulation as the outcome of this process, as suggested by Spantidaki Kyriazi et al.
(2021), I conducted serial mediation analyses with psychopathic traits as the predictor
variable, hedonistic or instrumental motives were the first mediator variable and emotion
goals as the second mediator variable. My findings indicate that hedonistic and
instrumental motives for anger and fear, along with emotion goals for anger and fear,
together mediated the relation between psychopathy and emotion dysregulation, which
provides support for Hypothesis 2 and 3. Consistent with findings from Spantidaki
Kyriazi et al. (2021), I found that people with psychopathic traits have general emotion
goals for experiencing anger due to their perceiving anger as a pleasant and useful
emotion. I also found that people with psychopathic traits have general emotion goals for
experiencing fear due to their perceiving fear as a useful emotion. Contradicting the
findings of Spantidaki Kyriazi et al. (2021), I found that people with psychopathic traits
also have general emotion goals for experiencing fear due to their perceiving fear as a
pleasant emotion. My findings suggest that the process by which people with
psychopathic traits experience emotion dysregulation is motivated by their perceptions of
pleasantness and utility of anger and fear, which in turn motivates their general desire for
experiencing anger and fear. These findings are consistent with the Fear-Enjoyment
Hypothesis (Hosker-Field et al., 2016), which suggests that people with psychopathic
traits are motivated to experience fear because they perceive the experience of fear as
enjoyable.
Regarding the emotion of joy, the current study found consistent and
contradictory results of those reported by Spantidaki Kyriazi et al. (2021). Specifically, I
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found that the relation between psychopathy and emotion goals for joy was mediated by
both hedonistic and instrumental motives for joy, whereas Spantidaki Kyriazi et al.
(2021) found that the relation between psychopathy and emotion goals for joy was solely
mediated by hedonistic motives for joy. My findings suggest that people with
psychopathic traits are less likely to have general emotion goals for experiencing joy due
to their perceiving joy as a less pleasant and less useful emotion. As with the emotions of
anger and fear, I extended the mediational models involving joy to include the outcome
variable of emotion dysregulation, with psychopathic traits being the predictor variable,
hedonistic or instrumental motives being the first mediator variable, and emotion goals
for joy being the second mediator variable. Results from the serial mediation analyses
indicate that together, the hedonistic motives and general emotion goals for joy mediated
the relation between psychopathy and emotion dysregulation, but not in the order
hypothesized. In this model, hedonistic motives for joy predicted emotion dysregulation
and emotion goals for joy, but emotion goals for joy did not predict emotion
dysregulation. In the second mediation model for the emotion joy, instrumental motives
for joy predicted emotion goals for joy, but neither instrumental motives nor emotion
goals for joy predicted emotion dysregulation. One possible explanation for these results
is due to the measurement of emotion dysregulation, which is discussed at length in the
limitations section. The key takeaway of these findings is that hedonistic and
instrumental motives for experiencing joy mediate the relation between psychopathy and
emotion goals for joy, which means that people with psychopathic traits are less likely to
hold emotion goals for joy due to their perception of joy as a less pleasant and less useful
emotion.
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Implications
The findings of the current study carries implications for mending at least three
problems within the general psychopathy literature, as well as for public health and
clinical contexts. The first issue is that researchers have historically misinterpreted people
with psychopathic traits as being incapable of feeling emotions; however, recent studies
have found that people with psychopathic traits do in fact experience emotions,
physically and subjectively (Blackburn & Lee-Evans, 1985; Dawel et al., 2012;
Derefinko, 2014; Hare & Neumann, 2008; Hicks & Patrick, 2006; Kosson et al., 2016;
Marsh, 2013; Marsh & Blair, 2008; Marsh et al., 2011). Although the levels of
psychopathy in this particular sample were on the lower end of the spectrum, I found
support for the notion that people with psychopathic traits do experience emotions. Thus,
the results of this study, while not reversing the decades long setback of treating people

with psychopathic traits as having an inability to experience emotions, does provide
support to the growing body of literature which suggests that people high on psychopathy
do have emotions.
Another issue within the psychopathy research field is that people with
psychopathic traits do not seek out treatment, and if they are in treatment, it is likely
court-mandated or within correctional facilities while they are incarcerated (Vien &

Beech, 2006). People with psychopathic traits in the general population are narcissistic
and externalize blame for their actions onto others, and therefore they do not see anything
wrong with themselves or their behavior that would lead them to seek treatment (Hare &
Neumann, 2008). Although the results of my study do not directly impact whether people
with psychopathic traits seek treatment, there are implications for public health
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awareness. Bringing awareness to the nature of psychopathic traits and their impacts may
be helpful in getting more people to seek treatment. Campaigns should prioritize the
publicizing of personality traits associated with psychopathy, as well as the secondary
problems associated with it in order to bring awareness to the fact that these traits and
secondary problems may be a sign of psychological issues warranting treatment. Some
secondary problems associated with psychopathy that may be publicized in an awareness

campaign include frequent work termination (e.g., joblessness, unemployment), an
inability to refrain from infidelity, and recurrent pregnancy or sexually transmitted
infection (STI) scares due hypersexuality and impulsivity, among others. In addition,
even if these campaigns do not directly result in people with psychopathic traits
recognizing the signs in themselves and seeking treatment on their own, bringing
awareness to the public may result in recommendations from the people around them to
seek out the information and inquire about treatment.
A third general problem within the psychopathy literature centers around the
supposed “untreatability” of psychopathy (Da Silva et al., 2021; Felthous, 2016; Hughes
et al., 2016; Kemp & Baskin-Sommers, 2019; Skeem et al., 2002; Vien & Beech, 2006).
For decades, researchers and clinicians alike have concluded that psychopathy is
untreatable, therefore leaving treatment providers with little hope that any sort of
improvement is possible for those with psychopathic traits (Blackburn, 1993, 2000;
Dolan & Coid, 1993; Losel, 1995; Salekin, 2002). One reason for which people with
psychopathic traits are considered untreatable by researchers is due to findings showing
that people with psychopathic traits demonstrate less clinical improvement with
treatment, lower levels of motivation in treatment, and higher rates of attrition to
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treatment than people without psychopathic traits (Ogloff et al., 1990). In addition, many
methodologically flawed studies examining various forms of treatment with psychopathic
offenders have concluded that psychopathic traits either worsened or remained the same
over the course of treatment, whereas secondary problems associated with psychopathy,
such as risk for violence and/or recidivism, also either increased over the course of
treatment or remained the same over the course of treatment (Da Silva et al., 2021;

DeSorcy et al., 2020; Felthous, 2016; Kemp & Baskin-Sommers, 2019; Salekin, 2002;
Vien & Beech, 2006). One example study conducted by Harris et al. (1991) concluded
that psychopathy may worsen with treatment. However, the treatment program utilized in
this study included “radical components” such as coercive tactics limiting patients’
ability to opt out or drop out, was primarily peer-operated with little input or supervision
from professional staff, and involved extreme “defense altering techniques” (Skeem et
al., 2002, p. 579). More specifically, patients were required to reside for up to two weeks
in “nude encounter groups in a total encounter capsule” where they were “fed through
tubes in the walls, in order to achieve true communication and discover their essential
nature” (Skeem et al., 2002, p. 579). Not only that, but they were also administered LSD,
alcohol, and other substances “in order to disrupt their glibness, aloofness, and hostility,
increase their anxiety, and make them chemically cooled out and dependent,” and thus
more accessible to peers and treatment (Skeem et al., 2002, p. 579). At the time of
writing in 2002, Skeem et al. noted that of the several studies addressing treatment
effectiveness in psychopathic offenders, there were only two nonrandomized control
trials investigating whether psychopathy moderates the effect of treatment on recidivism,
and thus there is “insufficient evidence to support the view that ‘nothing works’” (Losel,
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1995, p. 103). Thus, it appears that the field of psychopathy research is in need of highquality, evidence-based, theory-driven research, especially when investigating the
effectiveness of treatment.
Despite conclusions such as that by Losel (1995), the prevailing notion within the
niche of treatment providers remains that psychopathy cannot be treated Some primary
issues for treating psychopathy are people not seeking out treatment, having less clinical
improvement, having lower levels of motivation, and having higher rates of attrition than
people without psychopathic traits. In addition to theese issues,another problem facing
treating clinicians is that high-risk offenders (especially those with psychopathic traits)
often display characteristics that are not conducive to the establishment of a strong
therapeutic alliance, which is believed to be of critical importance and highly predictive
of therapeutic success, regardless of therapeutic modality or client characteristics

(Castonguay et al., 2006; Horvath et al., 1993). Because people with psychopathic traits
are often manipulative, deceptive, and non-responsive in treatment settings, clinicians
often perceive them as difficult or resistant clients, which leads clinicians to become
frustrated and hopeless as to the client’s treatability (Skeem et al., 2002). Although it may
be difficult to enact, one suggestion for these clinicians is to continuously address the
resistance, non-responsiveness, manipulativeness, and deceitfulness directly with the
client, with the hope that continued discussion of these actions will eventually lead to
their reduction in the client. Despite the therapeutic alliance being considered a very
important factor for the effectiveness of any psychological treatment, including that for
people with psychopathic traits, it may not be as important for those incarcerated with
psychopathic traits. For example, in a study addressing associations between working
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alliance to sex offender treatment completion and recidivism as a function of
psychopathy, DeSorcy et al. (2020) found that 85% of men scoring 25 or higher on the
PCL-R successfully completed the treatment program, and psychopathy did not
significantly predict treatment attrition. They also found that a strong working alliance
did not necessarily mean making positive treatment gains in the form of risk reduction; in
fact, they found that working alliance did not significantly predict any recidivism

outcomes whatsoever (DeSorcy et al., 2020). Given these results, the impact of
therapeutic alliance on treatment outcomes for those with psychopathic traits warrants
further investigation.
Another suggestion for treating those with psychopathic traits is to discuss the
importance of returning to treatment sessions, even if they do not feel it is necessary or
do not think there is/will be any improvement. This suggestion is based on results of a

study addressing the effectiveness of standard outpatient mental health services with civil
psychiatric patients both high and low in psychopathy. In this study, Skeem et al. (2002)
found that those high in psychopathy became generally less violent after receiving
“adequate doses” of treatment. More specifically, those patients’ high in psychopathy
who received seven or more treatment sessions during a 10-week period were three times
less likely to be violent during a subsequent 10-week period, compared to those with high
psychopathy scores who received six or fewer treatment sessions (Skeem et al., 2002).
These results were consistent even after controlling for factors that could have influenced
patients’ attendance, such as substance abuse, race, and employment status. Skeem et al.
(2002) also found that patients with high psychopathy scores receiving seven or more
sessions in a 10-week period were just as likely to improve as those with low
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psychopathy scores, whereas patients’ with high psychopathy scores receiving six or
fewer sessions in a 10-week period were equally as unlikely to improve as those with
high psychopathy scores receiving no treatment. Therefore, Skeem et al. (2002) conclude
that an important factor to consider when treating people with psychopathic traits is
treatment dose, especially in settings for which resources are scarce and individually
tailored treatment is not possible.
Although the results of my study did not investigate the treatment of psychopathic
traits, nor populations incarcerated or detained, there are implications for the general
treatment of psychopathy that can be gleamed from this study’s results. Before
addressing these treatment implications, it is important to discuss the current treatment
protocol for those with psychopathic traits. According to Kemp and Baskin-Sommers
(2019), the most common treatment in prisons revolve around some form of Cognitive-

Behavioral Therapy (CBT), which is aimed at identifying and challenging maladaptive
thoughts and behaviors in order to make them more adaptive and less disruptive. In
prisons, CBT techniques are typically implemented within group settings, but are
sometimes also implemented within individual settings. According to Kemp and BaskinSommers (2019), studies addressing the effectiveness of CBT techniques in group and
individualized settings conclude that CBT in both settings is relatively ineffective for
treating and improving psychopathy. As such, Baskin-Sommers et al. (2015) designed a
cognitive intervention that targets the attention to context deficit associated with
psychopathy, and examined its’ efficacy in a sample of incarcerated, adult male
offenders. This cognitive intervention is based on cognitive remediation, which is an
intervention intended to improve neuropsychological functioning such as attention or
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memory, and may be used to “address the tendency of psychopathic individuals to
neglect important contextual information” (Dargis et al., 2017, p. 217). Kemp and
Baskin-Sommers (2019) found that after six weeks of computerized training which taught
participants to practice attention to peripheral or nonsalient cues and notice changes in
contextual information, participants showed significant improvement on the pre- and
postmeasures of affective cognitive control deficits present in individuals with

externalizing traits (Kemp & Baskin-Sommers, 2019). The results of the current study
demonstrate that people with higher levels of psychopathy are motivated to experience
anger and fear due to their perceived pleasantness and utility of anger and fear.
Considering the attentional deficits associated with psychopathy, it stands to reason that
being more motivated to experience anger and fear will result in ignoring other emotional
cues. Ignoring other emotional cues to retain the experience of anger or fear may have
negative consequences, especially when it is an inappropriate time or place to act on
feelings of anger or fear. Thus, it is possible that a treatment combining aspects of
cognitive-remediation and CBT might be beneficial for improving the cognitive
deficiencies contributing to emotional dysregulation in psychopathy. Although this form
of treating psychopathy must be replicated in a non-laboratory setting to establish support
for its implementation, and since this form of treatment only addresses the attentional
deficits associated with the syndrome, it does provide a hopeful avenue for identifying
and targeting the cognitive-affective deficiencies associated with psychopathy, not only
with computerized tasks but also potentially generalizing to other situations in which
cognitive-affective deficiencies arise. Although they did not address cognitive
remediation as a treatment for improving psychopathic traits directly, Dargis et al. (2017)
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investigated whether priming participants with relevant words would improve their
ability to recognize peripheral information. Although the results of their study must be
replicated, they found that people in the general population with psychopathic traits
showed faster reaction time and greater accuracy on a lexical decision task after being
primed with words relevant to the task, compared to those who were primed with words
unrelated to the task. These findings by Dargis et al. (2017) and Kemp and Baskin-

Sommers (2019) provide a hopeful avenue for improving the attentional deficits
associated with psychopathy. Therefore, clinical researchers should consider further
developing treatment protocols based in cognitive remediation for improving attentional
skills in those with psychopathic traits.
The results of the current study help us understand the emotional experiences and
preferences of males with psychopathic personality traits, and offer a possible

explanation for why males with these traits regulate their emotions in a manner that
results in harmful, externalizing behavior. Having a better understanding of this process
may help focus prevention and rehabilitation efforts in clinical contexts. In clinical
practice with a male that has elevated levels of psychopathy and poor emotion regulation,
the clinician could examine his perceptions of pleasantness and usefulness of both anger
and fear to determine whether they are maladaptive and contribute to his emotion
dysregulation. The clinician could then help the client to develop strategies for
identifying and regulating these emotions in a more adaptive way. For instance, the
clinician could instruct the client to track their emotions subjectively and physiologically,
including how they regulated their emotions, and help them distinguish between adaptive
and maladaptive regulation strategies. In a situation wherein the client enjoys the
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experience of both anger and fear (which are physiologically arousing emotional
responses), and is describing their anger towards another person (which could result in
the client committing harm on the other person), the clinician could help the client to
redirect their anger toward appropriate activities that are physiologically arousing and
fear-inducing, such rock climbing or high diving. By showing an understanding of the
client’s emotional perceptions and preferences, these strategies may benefit the

therapeutic relationship, help build rapport, and improve motivation for change, which
are known challenges for working with clients with psychopathic traits (Ackerman &
Hilsenroth, 2001; Ogloff et al., 1990).
One program that provides a promising avenue for the treatment of psychopathic
traits in male detained youth that provides support for the suggestions made in the
paragraph above is the PSYCHOPATHY.COMP program developed by Da Silva et al.
(2021). PSYCHOPATHY.COMP is an individual intervention based on Compassion
Focused Therapy (CFT), which was “specifically designed to reduce psychopathic traits
by promoting a compassionate motivation in these youth” (Da Silva et al., 2021, p. 500).
According to CFT, all humans have an innate set of basic motivations to “survive, thrive
and form affiliative/attachment bonds”, and these motivations are regulated by biological
systems termed the threat system, drive system, and soothing system (Da Silva et al.,
2021, p. 500). From this perspective, an imbalance of basic motives and emotion
regulation systems leads to mental health problems, such as internalizing and
externalizing psychopathological symptoms and disorders. This perspective is consistent
with the findings of the current study, such that being highly motivated to experience
anger and fear leads to difficulties regulating one’s emotions as well as one’s behavior.
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CFT considers antisocial behavioral patterns and psychopathic traits as evolutionarily
rooted strategies for coping with harsh rearing scenarios, as in these poor rearing
environments, children struggle to develop adequate coping strategies and learn that the
world is a threatening place wherein no one is trustworthy and everyone else is either the
predator or the prey (Da Silva et al., 2021). As such, detained youth frequently present
with an overdeveloped and oversensitive threat system, a drive system that is self-focused
on short-term goals and wants, an underdeveloped soothing system, and central
emotional dysfunctions (Da Silva et al., 2021). Within CFT there are four sequential
modules: the first focuses on the basics of our mind, the second focuses on our mind
according to CFT, the third focuses on Compassionate Mind Training (CMT), and the
fourth focuses on recovery, relapse prevention, and finalization. When testing the
effectiveness of the PSYCHOPATHY.COMP program in a controlled trial, Da Silva et
al. (2021) found that psychopathic traits decreased over time in the treatment group, but
not the control group. The control group received Treatment As Usual (TAU), which is a
standard intensive treatment program for male detained youth using Cognitive Behavioral
Therapy (CBT) techniques. Not only did Da Silva et al. (2021) find that psychopathic
traits decreased over time in the treatment group, they also found that psychopathic traits
increased over time in the control group, meaning that TAU may actually contribute to
the maintenance of psychopathic traits. These findings suggest that without an
individually tailored program targeting psychopathic traits, psychopathic traits may
worsen and the presence of disruptive and antisocial behavior may increase after release
from incarceration. In addition, taking the results of the current study as well as the Da
Silva et al. (2021) study into consideration, it appears that working to understand and
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adapt the motivations that detained youth with psychopathic traits have for experiencing
anger and fear may help to improve their ability to regulate emotions and reduce other
problematic behavior.
Limitations and Future Directions
There are specific limitations to the present study that could be remedied in future
research studies, and some that could not. One limitation of the present study is the
correlational design. The present study sought to provide a preliminary examination of
the theorized process by which people with psychopathic traits experience emotion
dysregulation. Given the support for the theorized processes, future research should seek
to extend these findings by using methodological designs that can establish causal
relations between hedonistic and instrumental motives for experiencing anger, fear, and
joy, emotion goals for anger, fear, and joy, and emotion dysregulation. Researchers can

accomplish this using a longitudinal design, wherein participants’ psychopathic traits,
motives for experiencing emotions, emotion goals, and emotion dysregulation can be
tracked over time.
Another limitation to this study is generalizability. Because I recruited an allmale sample, the results of this study should not be generalized to female populations.
Future research should first attempt to replicate these findings in an all-female sample. In

addition, despite the MTurk sample being more representative of the U.S. population than
a college sample would have been, the MTurk sample was not precisely representative of
the U.S. population, as White/European Americans were undersampled (72.8% compared
to 76.3% of the general population), Blacks/African Americans were undersampled
(9.2% compared to 13.4% of the general population), Hispanic/Latinx participants were
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undersampled (4.6% compared to 18.5% of the general population), American
Indian/Alaska Natives were undersampled (0.4% compared to 1.3% of the general
population), and Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islanders were undersampled (0%
compared to 0.2% of the general population), whereas Asian Americans were
oversampled (7.6% compared to 5.9% of the general population; United States Census
Bureau, 2019). Therefore, future research should examine the relations between these

variables in a sample more representative of the U.S. population. Future researchers
should also examine these variables in incarcerated populations, as understanding the
process by which these variables contribute to emotion dysregulation is vital for
understanding whether and how emotion dysregulation contributes to criminal activity,
and where to focus prevention and rehabilitation efforts for reducing crime.
Lastly, there are measurement limitations to this study. Specifically, the

measure of emotion dysregulation used in this study may not capture dysregulation in the
context of experiencing joy. In fact, 14 of the 16 items on the Difficulties in Emotion
Regulation Scale-16 (DERS-16) start with the phrase “When I’m upset.” Therefore, the
items themselves are priming participants to think about the times when they are
experiencing negatively valenced emotions, rather than priming participants to think
about the times when they are experiencing both negatively valenced and positively
valenced emotions. Thus, findings from this study indicating that hedonistic and
instrumental motives for experiencing joy and emotion goals for joy do not serially
mediate the relation between psychopathy and emotion dysregulation may be explained
by the measurement of emotion dysregulation in the sole context of negatively valenced
emotions. In order to address this limitation, future researchers should develop measures

86
of emotion dysregulation that incorporate the context of positively valenced emotions,
such as joy. Such a measure would be relevant not only in the context of psychopathy,
but also in the context of other mental illnesses, such as Bipolar Disorder, for which
manic episodes are dysregulated experiences of positively valenced emotions often
characterized as “unlimited and haphazard enthusiasm” (APA, 2013, pp. 127).
Despite these limitations, this study has helped our understanding of the motivational
process by which males with psychopathic traits experience emotion dysregulation. I
hope that this study will encourage others to continue investigating the emotional
disturbances associated with psychopathic traits.
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Appendix A: Self-Report Psychopathy Scale – Short Form
Instructions: Please rate the degree to which you agree with the following statements
using numbers from the scale below. Your name will be detached from your answers so
you cannot be identified.
5-point Likert-type scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Moderately disagree,
4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree)
1. I’m a rebellious person.
2. I have never been involved in delinquent gang activity.
3. Most people are wimps.
4. I’ve done something dangerous just for the thrill of it.
5. I have tricked someone into giving me money.
6. I have assaulted a law enforcement official or social worker.
7. I have pretended to be someone else in order to get something.
8. I like to see fist-fights.
9. I would get a kick out of ‘scamming’ someone.
10. It’s fun to see how far you can push people before they get upset.
11. I enjoy doing wild things.
12. I have broken into a building or vehicle in order to steal something or vandalize.
13. I don’t bother to keep in touch with my family any more.
14. I rarely follow the rules.
15. You should take advantage of other people before they do it to you.
16. People sometimes say that I’m cold-hearted.
17. I like to have sex with people I barely know.
18. I love violent sports and movies.
19. Sometimes you have to pretend you like people to get something out of them.
20. I was convicted of a serious crime.
21. I keep getting in trouble for the same things over and over.
22. Every now and then I carry a weapon (knife or gun) for protection.
23. You can get what you want by telling people what they want to hear.
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24. I never feel guilty over hurting others.
25. I have threatened people into giving me money, clothes, or makeup.
26. A lot of people are “suckers” and can easily be fooled.
27. I admit that I often “mouth off” without thinking.
28. I sometimes dump friends that I don’t need any more.
29. I purposely tried to hit someone with the vehicle I was driving.
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Appendix B: Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale – 16
Instructions: Please indicate how often the following statements apply to you by choosing
the appropriate number from the scale below (1–5).
5-point Likert-type scale (1 = Almost never [0-10%], 2 = Sometimes [11-35%], 3 =
About half the time [36-65%], 4 = Most of the time [66-90%], 5 = Almost always [91100%])
1. I have difficulty making sense out of my feelings.
2. I am confused about how I feel.
3. When I am upset, I have difficulty getting work done.
4. When I am upset, I become out of control.
5. When I am upset, I believe that I will remain that way for a long time.
6. When I am upset, I believe that I’ll end up feeling very depressed.
7. When I am upset, I have difficulty focusing on other things.
8. When I am upset, I feel out of control.
9. When I am upset, I feel ashamed with myself for feeling that way.
10. When I am upset, I feel like I am weak.
11. When I am upset, I have difficulty controlling my behaviors.
12. When I am upset, I believe that there is nothing I can do to make myself feel
better.
13. When I am upset, I become irritated with myself for feeling that way.
14. When I am upset, I start to feel very bad about myself.
15. When I am upset, I have difficulty thinking about anything else.
16. When I am upset, my emotions feel overwhelming.
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Appendix C: Affect Valuation Index
Instructions: Listed below are a number of words that describe feelings. Some of the
feelings are very similar to each other, whereas others are very different from each other.
Read each word and then rate how often YOU WOULD IDEALLY LIKE TO HAVE that
feeling over the course of a typical week, using the following scale:

1

2

3

4

5

Never

A small amount
of the time

Half the time

Most of the
time

All the time

1. Over the course of a typical week, I would IDEALLY like to feel…
____ delighted
____ hostile
____ joyful

____ fearful
____ happy
____ angry

____ irritated
____ nervous
____ cheerful

____ scared

____ afraid

____ mad
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Appendix D: Perceived Affect Utility Scale - Revised
Instructions: You will be asked how much different emotions: (a) motivate you to
achieve your goals; and (b) make it easier for you to do things to achieve your goals.
By ‘‘goals’’ we mean the things that you generally seek to accomplish in everyday life,
or the things you typically try to do. Some examples of goals are ‘‘getting along with
others,’’ ‘‘trying to be the center of attention,’’ ‘‘trying to help others,’’ and ‘‘trying to do

what is best for myself.’’ Please pay close attention to subtle differences between
emotion words and answer each item to the best of your ability. Use the following scale
to record your answers.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly disagree

Slightly
disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Slightly agree

Strongly agree

1. Feeling ____ motivates me to achieve my goals.
____ delighted
____ fearful
____ irritated
____ hostile
____ happy
____ nervous
____ joyful
____ angry
____ cheerful
____ scared

____ afraid

____ mad

2. Feeling ____ makes it easier for me to do things that will help me to achieve
my goals.
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____ delighted
____ hostile
____ joyful

____ fearful
____ happy
____ angry

____ irritated
____ nervous
____ cheerful

____ scared

____ afraid

____ mad
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Appendix D: Attitudes Toward Emotions Questionnaire
Instructions: There are no right or wrong answers for the following questions. Please
answer honestly based on how you feel. Thank you for your participation. Please answer
each question using the scale provided below.”

1

2

3

4

5

Rarely/never

Occasionally

Sometimes

Often

Almost
always/always

Attitudes Toward Anger
I like the feeling of increased energy I get from expressing my anger
I like the feeling of power I get from expressing my anger
I like it when I feel like yelling at someone
I dislike how it feels when I am angry
I like how it feels when I am furious
Attitudes Toward Fear

I like to do things that scare me
I do things just because they scare me
I like being scared
I seek out things that scare me
I dislike being scared
I dislike doing things that scare me
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Attitudes Toward Joy
I do not really enjoy the moments in my life when I am happy
I like experiencing joy
I prefer to hang around with people who make me happy
I really like feeling happy
I like conversations that make me feel happy

123
Appendix E: Demographics
Instructions: Please indicate which of the following you most closely identify with. This
information will be kept confidential and will not be used to identify you.
1. What was your sex assigned at birth:
a. Male
b. Female
c. Intersex
2. What is your gender identity?
a. Woman
b. Man
c. Non-Binary
d. Self-identify:_____________________________________
3. What is your race/ethnicity? Choose all that apply.
a. American Indian or Alaska Native
b. Black or African American
c. Asian or Asian American
d. Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
e. White or European American
f. Hispanic/Latinx
g. Self-identify:_____________________________________
4. What is your age?
a. ____ (drop down)
5. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
a. No high school degree
b. Grade 12 or GED
c. Some education after high school, no degree/award
d. Trade certification
e. Vocational training
f. Associate’s degree
g. Bachelor’s degree (four-year degree)
h. Graduate degree (M.A., M.D., Ph.D, etc.)
6. What is your annual household income, before taxes?
a. Less than $10,000
b. $10,000 - less than $30,000
c. $30,000 - less than $50,000
d. $50,000 - less than $70,000
e. $70,000 - less than $100,000
f. $100,000 or more
7. MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status:
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Instructions: Think of this ladder as representing where people stand in the
United States. At the top of the ladder are the people who are the best off –
those who have the most money, the most education, and the most respected
jobs. At the bottom are the people who are the worst off – those who have
the least money, least education, the least respected jobs, or no job. The
higher up you are on this ladder, the closer you are to the people at the very

top; the lower you are, the closer you are to the people at the very bottom.
Where would you place yourself on this ladder?
At this time in your life, where do you think you stand on this ladder relative
to other people in the United States? Please click on the step that indicates
where you think you stand on this ladder at this time in your life compared
to other people in the United States.
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Appendix F: Informed Consent
Project Title: “Personality and Emotions”
Name of Investigator(s): Morning S. Baker, Nicholas Schwab, PhD
You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by students from the
University of Northern Iowa. The University requires that you give your agreement in
order to participate in this study. The following information is provided to help you make
an informed decision about whether or not to participate.
Purpose of this Study: The study will examine personality characteristics, perceptions
about emotions, and emotional experiences.
Explanation of Procedures: You will be presented with questions regarding your
personality characteristics, perception of emotions, and emotional experiences, and be
asked to rate how well the statements describe you. The study will take approximately 15
minutes to complete.
Discomfort and Risks: Risks are minimal.
Compensation and Benefits: Each participant will be compensated with $1.00 USD
immediately after completion of the study. This study could benefit society by
contributing to scientific research on the relationship between personality characteristics,
perceptions of emotions, and emotional experiences. There is no direct benefit for your
participation in this study besides the financial compensation offered.
Confidentiality: Your confidentiality will be maintained to the degree permitted by the
technology used. Specifically, no guarantees can be made regarding the interception of
data transmitted electronically. Survey data will not be retained on the Amazon servers,
but will be retained on the Qualtrics servers indefinitely. Data transferred from the survey
site will be saved in password protected files indefinitely. Any reports and presentations
about the findings from this study will not include your name or any other information
that could identify you. We may share the data we collect in this study with other
researchers doing future studies. Your IP address will be verified by CloudResearch to
ensure that your address is in the United States and that multiple surveys are not being
completed from the same address. This information will be deleted immediately after it is
verified.
Right to Refuse or Withdraw: Your participation is completely voluntary. You are free
to withdraw from participation at any time or choose not to participate at all. The
researcher may also withdraw your participation at any time.
Who do I contact for questions about the Study? For more information about the study
or study procedures, contact either of the following: Morning Baker bakermat@uni.edu,
or Nicholas Schwab Department of Psychology, University of Northern Iowa at
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nicholas.schwab@uni.edu or 319-273-2235. For questions about your rights as a research
participant, contact the University of Northern Iowa IRB Administrator Rebecca Rinehart
at rebecca.rinehart@uni.edu.
Agreement: I am fully aware of the nature and extent of my participation in this
study as stated above and the possible risks arising from it. I have been able to ask
questions and express my concerns about this study. I acknowledge that I have
received a copy of this consent statement. I am 18 years or older. I hereby agree to
participate in this study.

Click I agree to continue your participation.
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Appendix G: Debriefing
Thank you for participating! Today you answered questions regarding your personality
characteristics, perceptions about emotions, emotional experiences, and demographics.

The primary purpose of this research is to investigate how participants’ personality
characteristics and perceptions about emotions influence their emotional experiences.

The results of this study may be used to develop treatment interventions designed for
specific personality types.

If you have any questions about the study, please contact the following: Morning Baker
at bakermat@uni.edu, or Nicholas Schwab Department of Psychology, University of
Northern Iowa at nicholas.schwab@uni.edu. For questions about your rights as research
participants, please contact the UNI IRB Administrator Rebecca Rinehart at
rebecca.rinehart@uni.edu.

128
Appendix H: Attention Check Items
1. I have never used a computer. (Huang et al., 2015)
2. I can run 2 miles in 2 minutes. (Huang et al., 2015)
3. I work fourteen months in a year. (Huang et al., 2015)

